aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

Ch’ti, ou chtimi, désigne généralement un habitant du Nord-Pas-de-Calais, abusivement. Ce mot onomatopéique est apparu pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, en référence à l’accent picard des soldats nordistes. Le terme peut également désigner :

  • le ch’ti, nom donné au picard parlé en région Nord-Pas-de-Calais ;
  • la Ch’ti, une marque de bière ;
  • Le Chti est un guide gratuit de la métropole lilloise réalisé par des étudiants de l’EDHEC ;
  • Bienvenue chez les Ch’tis, un film français réalisé par Dany Boon et sorti en 2008.

 

aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

IPilihan Ganda

    Petunjuk : Berilah tanda silang (X) pada huruf a, b, c, d atau e pada jawaban  

                  yang paling tepat.

  1. Dibawah ini yang merupakan fungsi dari poros ialah…

a. sebagai pendukung bantalan

b. sebagai penerus tenaga melalui putaran mesin

c. sebagai penggerak mesin

d. sebagai tumpuan mesin

e. sebagai pengikat mesin

  1. Yang bukan termasuk klasifikasi poros menurut pembebanannya ialah…

a. poros transmisi                     c. poros engkol                                            e. poros nok

b. poros spindle                          d. poros gandar.

3.   Dibawah ini termasuk beban pada poros….kecuali….

a. poros dengan beban puntir

b. poros dengan beban lentur murni

c. poros dengan beban lentur dan puntir

d. poros dengan beban memanjang

e. poros dengan beban kombinasi

4.   Dibawah ini yang merupakan jenis dari bantalan ialah..

a. bantalan gelinding dan luncur      c. bantalan gelinding dan radial    e. bantalan ulir

b. bantalan luncur axial                                  d.. bantalan axial dan radial.

5.   Didalam bengkel kerja mesin, syarat-syarat utama untuk keselamatan kerja ialah….kecuali…

a. pakaian kerja selalu dikenakan

b. mentaati peraturan bengkel

c. rambut tidak panjang

d. tidak memakai sepatu dan topi kerja

e. memakai alat perlindungan diri.

6.   Dilihat dari bentuknya poros dibagi menjadi beberapa macam……..kecuali……

a. poros lurus                                 c. poros fleksibel                        e.poros lurus dan poros engkol

b. poros engkol                              d. poros input non fleksibel.

7.   Di bawah ini yang bukan termasuk syarat bahan dari poros ialah

a. baja lunak                               c.  tahan lelah                       e. tahan lelah dan tidak mudah retak

b. memiliki struktur yang homogen    d. tidak mudah retak.

8.   Berdasarkan dari pembebanan poros dibagi menjadi….kecuali

a. poros dengan beban lengkung.              d. poros dengan beban lengkung satu tumpuan

b. poros dengan beban radial                     e. . poros dengan beban axial

c..poros dengan beban puntire. .

9.   Dibawah ini merupakan penggunaan poros dalam kerja mesin…..

a. pendukung pahat/ pisau frais                 c. penggerak transporter         e. penggerak eretan

b. pendukung cekam                                   d. dudukan bed mesin.

10.  Poros terdapat dua macam berdasarkan konstruksinya, ialah….

a. poros tetap dan poros berputar              c. poros pendukung                   e. poros engkol

b. poros transporter                                       d. poros kepala lepas.

11. Yang bukan termasuk syarat-syarat bantalan poros ialah…..

a. cukup kuat mendukung poros.                d. dapat dilumasi dengan mudah

b. cukup kuat menahan mesin                               e. tahan aus dan tahan karat

c. mempunyai koefisien gesek kecil

12. Dibawah ini termasuk bahan dari bantalan,…..kecuali

a. besi cor                                                       c. perunggu  pospor                      e. kuningan

b. aluminium cor                                            d. perunggu

 

 

13. Di bawah ini yang bukan termasuk dari bantalan luncur ialah…

a. bantalan poros berkerah      c. bantalan radial berkerah                        e. bantalan radial tengah

b. bantalan radial polos                        d. bantalan radial ujung

14. Dibawah ini termasuk jenis-jenis dari kopling bos, kecuali…

a. kopling dengan pasak melintang

b. kopling dengan pasak memanjang

c. kopling flens kaku

d. kopling gesek rata

e. kopling  dengan sambungan gigi dalam

15. Yang merupakan  macam-macam kopling ialah…..

a. kopling flens                           c. kopling gesek konis                                e. kopling hidrolis

b. kopling tetap dan tidak tetap            d. kopling gesek rata

16 Di bawah ini yang merupakan fungsi dari kopling ialah….

a. untuk menyambung dua poros secara tetap atau tidak tetap.

b. untuk menghentikan putaran mesin

c. untuk menyambung putaran mesin

d. untuk memutarkan poros

e. untuk menhasilkan putaran mesin

17. Untuk mencegah agar pahat/ pisau frais, maka pada saat terjadinya penyayatan benda kerja harus diberi…

a. air coalant                               c. beram                                             e. ukuran

b. pelumas                                  d. serbuk pendingin

18. Diketahui suatu step, bahan mempunyai tegangan yang dijinkan = 80 N/ mm2, L= 100 mm dan beban maksimum F= 1000 N, berapa momen lengkungnya dan diameter d ?

a. M= 10.000 Nmm dan d= 2,35 mm

b. M= 1000   Nmm dan d= 23,5 mm

c. M= 100.000 Nm dan d= 23,35 mm

d. M=1.000.000 Nm dan d= 23,375 mm

e. M=100 Nm dan d= 21,35 mm

19. Dilihat dari bentuknya poros dibagi menjadi….kecuali

a. poros lurus                              c. poros bertingkat                           e. poros beralur

b. poros engkol                           d. poros axial

20. Di bawah ini merupakan fungsi dari balok geser….kecuali…

a. memeriksa sama tinggi tidaknya benda kerja

b. memeriksa sepusat tidaknya benda kerja

c. memeriksa keolengan dari benda kerja

d. menarik garis-garis gambar dari benda kerja

e. memeriksa diameter benda kerja

21. Dilihat dari ujung poros yang bersinggungan dengan bantalannya, poros tegak terdiri atas,

kecuali

a. poros tegak dengan ujung rata

b. poros tegak dengan ujung berlubang

c. poros tegak dengan ujung flens

d. poros tegak dengan ujung konis

e. poros tegak dengan ujung melingkar.

22. Jika poros tegak mendapatkan gaya tekan F dan berputar pada bantalannya, maka pada poros              tersebut akan mengalami…. Kecuali

a.  tekanan bidang                         c. momen puntir                               e. panas akibat gesekan

b. momen gesek                                        d. usaha gesek. .

 

 

23. Suatu poros tegak ujung rata mendapatkan gaya F= 15.000 N putaran 1,5 p/s, koefisien gesek µ = 0,05, hitunglah gaya geseknya !

a. 750 N                                       c. 900 N                                             e. 760 N

b. 850 N                                       d. 700 N

24. Suatu bantalan radial dengan data : diameter poros : 60 mm, panjang bantalan lo = 2do, koefisien gesek = 0,03, putaran 24 p/s, W = 2000 N, berapa momen geseknya?

a. 1600 Nmm                              c. 1,5 Nm                                          e. 2500 Nmm

b. 1,8 Nm                                     d. 1450 Nmm.

25. Diketahui bantalan poros vertical dengan data: diameter poros 150 mm, W = 15.000 N, µ = 0,05, n = 1,5 p/s, berapakah tekan bidangnya?

a. 1,785 N/mm2                          c. 0,85            N/mm2                                                e. 10  N/mm2

b. 0,75 N/mm2                              d 0,95 N/mm2

26. Dibawah ini yang termasuk sudut bor senter ialah …….kecuali

a. 120o dan 50o                           c. 60o dan 120o                                 e. .  140o dan 360o

b. 135o dan 60o                           d. 40o dan 135o

27. Didalam bengkel kerja mesin , syarat utama untuk keselamatan ialah……kecuali

a. pakaian rapi                c. pakaian tidak lengkap dan rambut panjang    e. mentaati peraturan bengkel

b. rambut pendek                       d. pakai pakaian kerja

28. Untuk membesarkan lubang yang sudah ada dapat kita gunakan pahat…………….

a. pahat bubut                                        c. pahat bubut tirus                   e. pahat ulir

b. pahat bubut rata                                d. pahat bubut dalam

29. Yang bukan termasuk peralatan mesin bubut ialah….

a. penjepit bor                                         c. micrometer luar                     e. jangka kaki

b. mistar sorong                                     d. jangka bengkok

30. Dibawah ini merupakan perlengkapan dari mesin bubut…..

a. pahat bubut                                        c. poros transporter                    e. jangka kaki

b. pelat cekan                                         d. mistar sorong

 

II. Essay

  1. Apakah fungsi Poros dan Bantalan?
  2. Sebutkan bahan poros untuk beban yang berubah-ubah !
  3. Sebutkan contoh penggunaan bantalan !
  4. Sebutkan macam-macam dari bantalan !
  5. Bantalan luncur terdiri dari berapa? Sebutkan !
  6. Apakah yang dimaksud dengan Defleksi ?
  7. Apakah fungsi kopling pada mesin perkakas?
  8. Sebutkan alat ukur yang digunakan dalam praktek kerja mesin beserta fungsi alat ukur tersebut (5 alat ukur) !
  9. Apakah yang dimaksud dengan mereamer ?

10. Apakah tujuan dari pegkartelan?

 

Kunci Jawaban DKK 4

1. B                       11. B               21. E

2. B                       12. B               22. C

3. D                       13. A               23. A

4. A                       14. D               24. B

5. D                       15. B               25 .C

6. D                       16. A               26. C

7. A                       17. A               27. C

8. D                       18. C               28. D

9. A                       19. D               29. A

10.A                      20. C               30. D.

 

*****Selamat Mengerjakan*****

 

aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

Anime: A Certain Scientific Railgun S, Accel World EX, Ace Of Diamond, Ai Mai Mi Aiura, AKB0048: Next Stage, Aku No Hana Amnesia, Ano Hi Mita Hana No Namae Wo Bokutachi Wa Mada Shiranai. Movie, Arata Kangatari, Arpeggio Of Blue Steel, Arve Rezzle: Kikaijikake No Yosetachi, Astro Boy, Shingeki no Kyojin, Aura: Maryuuinkouga Saigo No Tatakai (Movie), Bakumatsu Gijinden Roman, Berserk The Golden Age Ac Lll – Descent BlazBlue: Alter Memory, Blood Lad Blue Exorcist (Movie), Boku Wa Tomodachi Ga Sukunai Next, Brother’s Conflict Buki Yo Saraba (Movie), Cardfight!! Vanguard: Link Joker-Hen, Chihayafuru 2, Chitose Get You!!, Chokotan! Codenerdreaker, Coppelion, Corpse Party: Tortured Souls – Bougyakusareta Tamashii No Jukyou, Cuticle Tantei Inaba, D.C.III ~ Da Capo III ~, Dakara Boku Wa H Ga Dekinai, Danganronpa The Animation, Dansai Burni No Crime Edge, Dareka No Manazashi Date A Live, DD Hokuto No Ken (2013), Death Billiards, Devil Survivor 2 The Animation, Diabolik Lovers, Dokidoki! 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SS, Rozen Maiden (2013), Ryo, Saint Young Men, Saki: Achiga-Hen – Episode Of Side-A Specials, Samurai Flamenco, Sasami-San@Ganbaranai, Say “I Love You”, Seitokai Yakuindomo, Senhime Zesshou Symphogear G, Senran Kagura, Senyuu, Servant X Service Silver Spoon Sket Dance (OVA) Space Brothers, Sparrow’s Hotel, Star Driver The Movie, Steins;Gate: Fuka Ryouiki No Déjà Vu , Stella Jogakuin Koutou-Ka C³-Bu Strike The Blood, Super Seishun Brothers, Tamako Market Tamayura: More Aggressive, Tanken Driland: 1000-Nen No Mahou, Tantei Opera Milky Holmes: Alternative (OVA), Teekyuu 2, Tesagure! 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Music: The Temper Trap – Love Lost, The Vaccines – If You Wanna, The XX – Intro

Suka ·  · Bagikan · 8 November 2013

rif”‘�� ie� ��� adjah Mada: 2014)

 

A suivi formation pour être un traducteur dans le centre de formation linguistique: 2015

 

LANGUES

Indonesie – langue maternelle ,anglais -courant, français – courant, espagne – lu, écrit, parlé

, italien – lu, écrit, parlé

 

VIE D’ASSOCIATIVE

président de la jeunesse de Perumahan Margorejo Asri

 

SPORTS

Karate

Football

 

aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

Aldilah Bagas Dewantara

15, Rue Magelang

55514 Sleman

Indonesia

085725837597

abdewantara@yahoo.com

20 ans, celibataire

 

TRADUCTEUR

 

 

EXPÉRIENCE PROFESSIONNELLE

2014-2015       Un guide de Berkelana Agency

 

2015-2016       Traducteur de Alfa Media Rue  Monumen Jogja Kembali 75A Yogyakarta

Traduire les livres Anglais et Francais

 

2013-2014        un tuteur au tutorat Supergama

 

FORMATION

Traducteur  agréée français-indonesien indonesian-anglais et anglais- français

(Indonesian Translators Association : 2017)

Maîtrise ès traduction français-anglais  indonesien-anglais  et français-indonesien

(institute de langue Yogyakarta, Indonesie :2016)

Diplome de literature francais

(Universitas Gadjah Mada: 2014)

A suivi formation pour être un traducteur dans le centre de formation linguistique: 2015

 

LANGUES

Indonesie – langue maternelle ,anglais -courant, français – courant, espagne – lu, écrit, parlé

, italien – lu, écrit, parlé

 

VIE D’ASSOCIATIVE

président de la jeunesse de Perumahan Margorejo Asri

 

SPORTS

Karate

Football

 

aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

  • 99 Langkah Menuju Kesempurnaan Iman

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91. Pandai-pandailah untuk melupakan kesalahan orang dan pandai-pandailah untuk melupakan jasa kita;
92. Jangan berbuat sesuatu yang menyebabkan orang lain terganggu dan jangan berkata sesuatu yang dapat menyebabkan orang lain terhina;
93. Jangan cepat percaya kepada berita jelek yang menyangkut teman kita sebelum dipastikan kebenarannya;
94. Jangan menunda-nunda pelaksanaan tugas dan kewajiban;
95. Sambutlah huluran tangan setiap orang dengan penuh keakraban dan keramahan dan tidak berlebihan;
96. Jangan memforsir diri untuk melakukan sesuatu yang diluar kemampuan diri;
97. Waspadalah akan setiap ujian, cobaan, godaan dan tentangan. Jangan lari dari kenyataan kehidupan;
98. Yakinlah bahwa setiap kebajikan akan melahirkan kebaikan dan setiap kejahatan akan melahirkan merusakan;
99. Jangan sukses di atas penderitaan orang dan jangan kaya dengan memiskinkan orang

“Sebarkanlah walau satu ayat pun” (Sabda Rasulullah SAW) “Nescaya Allah memperbaiki bagimu amalan-amalanmu dan mengampuni bagimu dosa-dosamu. Dan barangsiapa mentaati Allah dan Rasul-Nya, maka sesungguhnya ia telah mendapat kemenangan yang besar.” (Surah Al-Ahzab:71)

============
Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
==============

Pernahkan anda menerima atau mengirim pantun lucu atau sms pantun…?

Wah kalo pernah, sharing di sini dunkkk….sapa tau aja bisa di copy paste nehhh..
============================================
dulu delman
sekarang dokar
dulu teman
sekarang pacar
=====================

makan kue, minum sekoteng
gue emang ganteng

=====================

Makan Jengkol Perut Melilit
Doyan Miscall pulsa dikit..!!

=========================

jualan es depan sekolah
sms, laah……….!!!

===========================

Buah jeruk buah kedondong……
Mbah ikutan nongkrong dooong….

=======================

hati siapa tak bimbang
situ botak minta dikepang
==========================

Buah kedondong Buah atep
Dulu bencong sekarang tetepp …………..
==========================

Buah semangka buah duren
Nggak nyangka gue keren
=========================

Buah semangka buah manggis
Nggak nyangka gue manis
=======================

Buah apel di air payau
Nggak level layauuuuuuu…..
==================

Pohon kelapa, Pohon durian,
Pohon Cemara, Pohon Palem
Pohonnya tinggi-tinggi Bo!
========================

Buah Nanas, Buah bengkoang
Buah jambu, Buah kedondong
Ngerujak dooooooooonggggggg…
==========================

Ada padi, Ada jagung
Ada singkong, Ada pepaya
Panen ni yeeeeeeeeeeeee!
===============================

Disini bingung, Disana linglung
mangnya enak, engga nyambung….
=================================

Buah semangka berdaun sirih
Buah ajaib kali yah?????????
============================

Jalan kaki ke pasar baru
Jauh boooooooooooo….
========================

Jambu merah di dinding
Jangan marah just kidding
==========================

Jauh di mata,dekat dihati
Jauh di hati,dekat dimata
Jauh-dekat tujuh ratus perak
============================

Nemu gesper, di pinggir jalan
Kalo laper, makan tu gesper
===========================

Men sana in corpore sano
Gue maen kesana,
Elo maen ke sono!
=============================

Disana gunung, disini gunung,
Ditengah-tengah bunga melati
Saya bingung kamu pun bingung
Kenapa ada bunga melati ???!?
========================

Anak ayam turun ke bumi
Induk ayam naik kelangit
Anak ayam nyari kelangit
Induk ayam nyungsep ke bumi
==========================

Sayur asem sayur sop
laper nich
==========================

banyak-banyak menabung
kagak nyambung
=========================

dilangit ada tomat
sengit amat
==========================

buah kedong-dong buah tomat
Elu bodong amat
=========================

buah duren di pohon beringin
rese’ banget tuch duren….
=======================

ayam kurus bulunya banyak
rugi banget yang beli………

=============================

jaka sembung naik becak
lagi males jalan cak
=========================
beli duren ke irian jaya
emang disini dak ada ya
=============================

jalan2 ke kota baru
beli lontong kuahnya basi
dasar tukang lontong kurang ajar…
=========================

ikan hiu makan badak, i love u mendadak…
ikan paus makan pecel, i miss u girl…

(dari alfian)
===========================

satu ditambah satu yaitu dua
dua ditambah dua yaitu dengan empat
baru belajar ngitung ni yee…
==========================

ada lele ada belut
ada kerang ada siput
mo pesan yang mana?

========================

kueh cucur enak rasanya
kueh serabi putih warnanya
hatiku hancur karena cinta
siapakah yg akan jadi pengobatnya
=========================
muter muter di pulau formosa
memang indah pemandanganya
ku hargai kritik dan saranya
semoga bermanfaat bagi kita semua

=============================
buah jambu buah sirsak….
buah duku buah durian….
ya… buah2an dweh…..

=====================

Jalan kaki ke kalimantan…
cepeeeee deeeeehhhh.

=======================

makan es perut melilit..
mau SMS juga, pulsa tinggal dikit

==========================

Pergi ke pasar, nyari obat gatal
Dasar, Gak modal!!

========================

buah mangga buah manggis
ternyata ada cewek maniez
===============================
buah manggis buah pepaya
cewek manis siapa yg punya

======================

dihutan banyak lebah madu..
rasanya manis,disuka pemburu..
kamu adalah cintaku dan aku amat sayang padamu..

========================

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Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
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kembang gula di perigi
untuk aku minum jamu
kemana pun kamu pergi
aku slalu rindu kamu

============================
meski hanya buah jambu
tapi ini bisa diramu
meskipun jarang ketemu
cintaku hanya untukmu

===========================
wahai seruling buluh perindu
suaranya memikatku
wahai gadis pujaanku
aku sangat cinta kamu

==============================
meski aku sudah kenyang
tetap harus minum jamu
perempuan yang ku sayang
bolehkah aku bertamu
================================
Kelap kelip bintang bertaburan

hanya satu yg tampak terang

sungguh banyak pria pilihan

hanya kanda yg paling ku sayang

=========================

Kelap kelip bintang bertaburan

begitu indah bagai berlian

sungguh banyak pria menawan

hanya abang yg ku rindukan

=======================

Kelap kelip di tengah malam

ku lihat bintang sangat menawan

biar cinta banyak rintangan

ku jaga cinta dg kesetiaan

=====================

Kelap kelip bintang seribu

indah menawan di tengah malam

sunggu aku sedang merindu

rindu di hati yg terdalam

=========================

Kelap kelip bintang menari

indah bagai mata bidadari

kanda kuharap menjaga diri

untuk diriku sampei ku kembali
================================

Sayang selasih tidak berbunga
Engganlah kumbang untuk menyapa
Sayang kekasih tidak setia
Badan merana kini jadinya
=============================
Di sana sini bunga pun kembang
Senanglah kumbang tinggal sendiri
Putuslah sudah kasih dan sayang
Jangan di harap dia kembali

================================
Sungguh malangnya hidupmu bunga
Janganlah layu sebelum kembang
Tentulah diri akan merana
Karena bunga tiada berdaya

============================
Bunga yang malang jaga dirimu
Jangan lah layu sebelum kembang
Pupuklah iman dalam hatimu
Kalau kau layu di buang orang.

=============================
Ukir-ukir lah si kayu jati,jadikanlah sebuah jambangan
Pikir-pikir sebelum terjadi,janganlah menyesal kemudian,
=========================

Hati-hati menyeberang
Jangan sampai titian patah
Hati-hati di rantau orang
Jangan sampai berbuat salah

================================
Manis jangan lekas ditelan
Pahit jangan lekas dimuntahkan
Mati semut karena manisan
Manis itu bahaya makanan.

============================
Buah berangan dari Jawa
Kain terjemur disampaian
Jangan diri dapat kecewa
Lihat contoh kiri dan kanan

=====================

Anak ayam turun sepuluh
Mati satu tinggal sembilan
Tuntutlah ilmu dengan sungguh-sungguh
Supaya engkau tidak ketinggalan

===============================
Anak ayam turun sembilan
Mati satu tinggal delapan
Ilmu boleh sedikit ketinggalan
Tapi jangan sampai putus harapan

============================
Anak ayam turun delapan
Mati satu tinggal lah tujuh
Hidup harus penuh harapan
Jadikan itu jalan yang dituju
===========================

Di tepi kali saya menyinggah
Menghilang penat menahan jerat
Orang tua jangan disanggah
Agar selamat dunia akhirat

=====================================
Tumbuh merata pohon tebu
Pergi ke pasar membeli daging
Banyak harta miskin ilmu
Bagai rumah tidak berdinding

=============================
Pinang muda dibelah dua
Anak burung mati diranggah
Dari muda sampai ke tua
Ajaran baik jangan diubah

==========================

asam kendis asam gelugur
ke 3 asam riang riang
badan menangis di dlm kubur
teringat badan tak pernah sembahyang

===========================
Kemumu di tengh pekan
Di hembus angina jatuh ke bawah
Ilmu yang tak pernah di amalkan
Bagai pohon tak berbuah

=============================
Buah smangka buah labu
Buah d ats enak rsanya
B’bondonglh km mnuntut ilmu
Krn wjb hukumnya

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Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
==============

Naik pesawat ke pakistan
Smpaix pst cepat
Bljrlh dr kesalahan
Klk kbhagiaan kn d dapat

=========================
ada harta tidak terjaga
Ada peti tidak berkunci
kisah cinta anak remaja
Sekejap kasih sekejap benci

==========================
Ada pijat tuan buangkan
Ada inti pulut direndam
Ada hasrat tidak diucapkan
Ada hati kenapa dipendam?

========================
Anak ayam belajar berenang
Anak itik di paya bakau
Mulut menyebut hati terkenang
Rindukan adik jauh di rantau
=============================

Anak bangsawan menjahit tabir
Sulam di tepi siku keluang
Benci tuan Cuma di bibir
Dalam hati membara sayang
=========================
Aneka warna awan di langit
Alam indah bak lukisan
Harapkan cinta dari si genit
Isteri di rumah dilupakan

=========================

Angin menderu pokok bergoyang
Ribut taufan hujan berderai
Bulan madu mengusap sayang
Bulan depan diajak bercerai?
=========================

Angin sejuk menggigit tulang
Baju tebal cepat dicari
Cerai dirujuk kasih berulang
Cinta sejati Cuma sekali?
=========================

Asam paya si asam pauh
Limau abung beli sekati
Tuan bahagia di benua jauh
Saya di kampung menanti-nanti
===========================

Bagai diandam daun di dahan
Ditiup angin bunyi berdesir
Rindu dendam tidak tertahan
Nasi dingin terasa pasir!
==========================

Basah kuyup berdiang ke api
Kering juga kain dan baju
Angin bertiup menyentuh pipi
Kasih menyapa membawa rindu

==========================

Belum tahu pedasnya lada
Belum rasa pahitnya jadam
Belum mahu digelar janda
Belum mesra cintamu padam
=========================

Belum tua sudah bersabut
Delima muda gugur merekah
Jatuh hati kasih bersambut
Habis sekolah kita bernikah

========================

Yuminten
Ngemut Sepur
Cekap Semanten
Anggen kulo matur
=====================

Es teh
gulone batu
Tiwas mekekeh
ora biso metu
==========================

sumber:
http://selendang.wordpress.com/
http://januardi.blogspot.com/
http://salam-online.web.id/2008/03/01/pantun-nasihat-2.html
http://wuryanano.blogspot.com/
http://toppuisi.blogspot.com/

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pantun
===========================

Tingkap papan kayu bersegi,
Sampan sakat di Pulau Angsa;
Indah tampan kerana budi,
Tinggi bangsa kerana bahasa.
===========================

Buah berangan masaknya merah,
Kelekati dalam perahu;
Luka di tangan nampak berdarah,
Luka di hati siapa yang tahu.
=============================

Dari mana punai melayang,
Dari paya turun ke padi;
Dari mana datangnya sayang,
Dari mata turun ke hati.
============================

Pucuk pauh delima batu,
Anak sembilang di tapak tangan;
Tuan jauh di negeri satu,
Hilang di mata di hati jangan.
==================================
Kalau tuan jalan ke hulu,
Carikan saya bunga kemboja;
Kalau tuan mati dahulu,
Nantikan saya di pintu syurga.
=========================

Halia ini tanam-tanaman,
Ke barat juga akan condongnya;
Dunia ini pinjam-pinjaman,
Akhirat juga akan sungguhnya.
==========================
Malam ini merendang jagung,
Malam esok merendang serai;
Malam ini kita berkampung,
Malam esok kita bercerai.
========================
jalan-jalan ke kota paris
banyak rumah berbaris-baris
biar mati diujung keris
asal dapat dinda yang manis…

ke cimanggis membeli kopiah
kopiah indah kan kau dapati
begitu banyak gadis yang singgah
hanya dinda yang memikat hati

jika aku seorang pemburu
anak rusa kan kudapati
jika dinda merasa cemburu
tanda cinta masih sejati

darimana datangnya sawah
dari sawah turun ke kali
darimana datangnya cinta
dari mata turun ke hati

============================
Bau-bau jembatan tujuh,,
tempat memungut sebuah lolah,,
kalau adinda udah setujuh,,
tunggulah saya tamat sekolah,,
Pisang nangka buat kolak
Jambu biji diblendrin
Kalo nona tetep galak,
Lebaran depan ga dimaapin

menaiki kereta merknya honda
pergi selayang kerumah hanapi
bila cinta mekar di dada
siang terkenang malam termimpi

anak unta siapa yg punya
menangis iba kehilangan ibu
bila cinta sudah menyapa
rindu mulai membara dikalbu

mulanya duka kini menjadi lara
teman tiada hanyalah sendu
bila rindu mulai membara
itulah tanda cinta berpadu

hati berdetik dalam cahaya,
seperti belati menikam dada
Cinta abadi kekal selamanya
Musim berganti tapi wajah takkan lupa

cinta datang tak berwaktu
perasaan senang,sedih dan pilu tak menentu
semua hadir tanpa permisi
untuk mencoba mengisi hati

hati-hati minum digelas
kalau terlepas pecahlah nanti
cinta hati selalunya ikhlas
cinta buta yang makan hati

cinta tak memandang bulu
cinta juga tak mengenal waktu
rasakan cinta dihatimu
betapa indah mengikis kalbu

bila terluka berkata begitu
hingga terlupa cinta yang suci
cinta manusia memanglah begitu
cinta padaNYA cinta yang sejati

terluka hati karna kata udah biasa
namun terluka karna usia sungguh asa
bila kata dianggap tak bermakna
tapi usia adalah segalanya

Untuk menjadi seorang perwira
Harus bertapa di dalam gua
Kalau cinta kukuh di jiwa
Biar melayang kembali jua

papua tanah impian jiwa
kubermimpi melayang terbang kesana
teman sehati selalu bersua
karena tak bisa terpisahkan begitu saja

panah cinta tlah menancap…
kedua hati pun menyatu…
asmara semakin mendekap…
cinta takkan berlalu…

anak ayam turun ke kali
bermain air riang gembira
betapa senangnya bisa ngejunk lagi
memburu kata mengejar tawa

minum arak pahit rasanya…
tidak cocok untuk anak kuliah…
apalah daya sudah usaha…
belum apa-apa sudah binasah…

sunggulah indah si burung pipit
terbang yang tenang si burung dara
bila ku tahu bercinta sakit
takkan ku mulai dari semula

orang palembang menanam padi
negeri malaka negeri seberang
putus cinta jangan bersedih
dunia ini masih panjang

burung kakatua
hinggap dijendela
siapa yang jatuh cinta
pasti cemburu buta

Burung kakak tua udah tak berdaya
Burung adik muda terbang ke angkasa
Makasi kakek telah berjuang bela negara
Sekarang adek bahagia di hari MERDEKA

kucing kurus mandi dipapan
papan nya sikayu jati
aku kurus bukan karena kurang makan
tetapi mikirin sijantung hati

disana gunung disini gunung
ditengah tengah gunung berapi
kesana bingung kesini bingung
itulah namanya jatuh hati
=====================================
cinta adalah buta…
buta adalah cinta…
ketik C spasi D…
cape D…

(Ket: pantun gaya baru,pola AABB)
===================================

Banyak bunga di taman cuma satu kupetik
Banyak anak perawan cuma Adik yang cantik

=======================

Pria:
Banyak bunga di taman cuma satu kupetik
Banyak anak perawan cuma Adik yang cantik

Wanita:
Banyak buah semangka dibawa dalam sampan
Banyak anak jejaka cuma Abang yang tampan

Pria:
Berjuta bintang di langit
Satu yang bercahaya
Berjuta gadis yang cantik
Adiklah yang kucinta

Wanita:
Pandai Abang merayu, hatiku rasa malu

Pria:
Rumah atapnya tinggi terbuat dari bambu
Cuma Adik kupilih dan yang selalu kurindu

Wanita:
Gunung puncaknya tinggi tertutup oleh salju
Memang Abang kupilih dan yang selalu kurindu
=============================

Jika tuan mudik ke hulu
Carikan saya bunga kemboja.
Jika tuan mati dahulu
Nantikan saya di pintu surga.
===============================
Batang buluh berisi santan,
Bunga mawar seri pengantin,
Untung sungguh nasib badan,
Ada penawar zahir batin.
=============================

rancak gagah silat pahlawan
bertahan di kanan menyerang di kiri
tatkala bulan dilindung awan
mengapa pungguk berdiam diri?

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Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
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kumpulan pantun – koleksi pantun

berikut ini kumpulan pantun cinta , pantun romantis , pantun jenaka , pantun humor , pantun nasehat , pantun dakwah , pantun gokil , pantun mesra , pantun kreatif, pantun lucu , pantun rayuan gombal , pantun indah , pantun menarik , dll

Unik > fun > kata kata > Kumpulan Pantun Jenaka – Pantun Lucu

Kumpulan Pantun Jenaka – Pantun Lucu

Pantun adalah salah satu teknik bersosialisasi yang cukup efektif untuk menyampaikan pesan yang dimaksud. Dengan Pantun, kita bisa merangkai kata-kata yang enak di dengar tanpa mengurangi makna pesan yang disampaikan. Pantun sangat baik untuk dipakai untuk berbagai keperluan, seperti dalam rapat, dalam naskah pidato sampai saat kita tengah ngobrol dengan orang lain.

Salah satu jenis pantun yang paling di sukai adalah jenis Pantun Lucu atau Pantun Jenaka. Karena dengan pantun ini, kita bisa mencairkan suasana, merefresh suasana sejenak, atau bisa juga menarik tawa dan senyum dari orang yang mendengarkan pantun lucu jenaka kita.

Berikut ini adalah beberapa contoh Pantun Lucu atau Pantun Jenaka.

pantun jenaka – pantun lucu
PANTUN JENAKA – PANTUN LUCU
Bangkok kota seribu pagoda
Mekah adalah kota suci
Kuakui kau sungguh menggoda
Tapi sayang kau seorang banci

karung hilang dikasih semen
ditinggal ayam satu kabur
gimana ente dibilang cemen
dikasih cendol malah kabur

Malam hari main kulintang
ditemani sobat sobat tersayang
gimana hati kagak bimbang
Kepala botak minta dikepang

Daun sirih daun kelor
Ayam berkokok mau bertelor
apa isi di balik kolor
satu pistol dua pelor

seorang anak bernyanyi ria
sambil bernyanyi menari pula
siapa yang tidak bakal tertawa
disangka waras ternyata gila

perut melilit makan jengkol
orang pelit doyan miscoll

Makan Jengkol Perut Melilit
Doyan Miscall pulsa sedikit

Buah kedondong Biji selasih
Dulu bencong sekarang masihhhhhh

Buah semangka buah duren
Nggak nyangka gue keren

Ada padi, Ada jagung
Ada singkong, Ada pepaya
Panen ni yeeee!

makan kue, minum sekoteng
ternyata gue emang ganteng

Baju baru dipake sayang
beli dimall pake atm mandiri
knapa semua pada kabur sayang
itu karena kamu belum mandi

kalo mau menanam padi
lihat dulu cuacanya
kolo tau Q mau mandi
Jangan lupa, ngintip ya!

Pergi ke pasar naik onta
Membeli anting intan permata
Gak peduli situ udah tua
Yang penting saling mencinta

Buah Jeruk Buah Kedongdong
Muke loe kayak kedongdong

Buah kedongdong buah manggis
walo muka kayak gerandong, yang penting artis

Jaka Sembung bawa Golok
Mau di Asah

Buah belimbing buah rambutan
itu kumis apa hutan…

sibotak bawa sisir
gak ada kerjaan

Semoga Pantun Jenaka diatas berkenan buat anda. Sebenarnya cukup mudah untuk membuat pantun, yang jelas anda perlu kreatifitas dalam memilih kata-kata agar isi pesan yang anda coba sampaikan bisa berpola dengan akhiran dengan pola A-A-A-A, atau Pola A-B-A-B, sehingga lebih enak di dengar dan mudah dipahami.

Sibotak pake helm Baja
Niat Kepasar sama Bini
Oke Deh Segitu Aja
Jangan Lupa Mampir Lagi Kesini ! ^_^

Original Source : Kumpulan Pantun Jenaka – Pantun Lucu http://www.poztmo.com/2011/10/pantun-lucu-jenaka.html#ixzz1fa3RjXPH

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Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
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Pantun
Dari Wikipedia bahasa Indonesia, ensiklopedia bebas

Pantun merupakan salah satu jenis puisi lama yang sangat luas dikenal dalam bahasa-bahasa Nusantara. Dalam bahasa Jawa, misalnya, dikenal sebagai parikan, dalam bahasa Sunda dikenal sebagai paparikan, dan dalam bahasa Batak dikenal sebagai umpasa (baca: uppasa). Lazimnya pantun terdiri atas empat larik (atau empat baris bila dituliskan), setiap baris terdiri dari 8-12 suku kata, bersajak akhir dengan pola a-b-a-b dan a-a-a-a (tidak boleh a-a-b-b, atau a-b-b-a). Pantun pada mulanya merupakan sastra lisan namun sekarang dijumpai juga pantun yang tertulis.

Semua bentuk pantun terdiri atas dua bagian: sampiran dan isi. Sampiran adalah dua baris pertama, kerap kali berkaitan dengan alam (mencirikan budaya agraris masyarakat pendukungnya), dan biasanya tak punya hubungan dengan bagian kedua yang menyampaikan maksud selain untuk mengantarkan rima/sajak. Dua baris terakhir merupakan isi, yang merupakan tujuan dari pantun tersebut.

Karmina dan talibun merupakan bentuk kembangan pantun, dalam artian memiliki bagian sampiran dan isi. Karmina merupakan pantun “versi pendek” (hanya dua baris), sedangkan talibun adalah “versi panjang” (enam baris atau lebih).
Daftar isi

1 Peran pantun
2 Struktur pantun
3 Jenis-jenis Pantun
4 Lihat pula
5 Pranala luar

Peran pantun

Sebagai alat pemelihara bahasa, pantun berperan sebagai penjaga fungsi kata dan kemampuan menjaga alur berfikir. Pantun melatih seseorang berfikir tentang makna kata sebelum berujar. Ia juga melatih orang berfikir asosiatif, bahwa suatu kata bisa memiliki kaitan dengan kata yang lain.

Secara sosial pantun memiliki fungsi pergaulan yang kuat, bahkan hingga sekarang. Di kalangan pemuda sekarang, kemampuan berpantun biasanya dihargai. Pantun menunjukkan kecepatan seseorang dalam berfikir dan bermain-main dengan kata.

Namun demikian, secara umum peran sosial pantun adalah sebagai alat penguat penyampaian pesan.

Struktur pantun

Menurut Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana fungsi sampiran terutama menyiapkan rima dan irama untuk mempermudah pendengar memahami isi pantun. Ini dapat dipahami karena pantun merupakan sastra lisan.

Meskipun pada umumnya sampiran tak berhubungan dengan isi kadang-kadang bentuk sampiran membayangkan isi. Sebagai contoh dalam pantun di bawah ini:

Air dalam bertambah dalam
Hujan di hulu belum lagi teduh
Hati dendam bertambah dendam
Dendam dahulu belum lagi sembuh

Beberapa sarjana Eropa berusaha mencari aturan dalam pantun maupun puisi lama lainnya. Misalnya satu larik pantun biasanya terdiri atas 4-6 kata dan 8-12 suku kata. Namun aturan ini tak selalu berlaku.

Jenis-jenis Pantun

Artikel atau bagian artikel ini mungkin lebih cocok dipindahkan ke Wikisource

Pantun Adat

Menanam kelapa di pulau Bukum
Tinggi sedepa sudah berbuah
Adat bermula dengan hukum
Hukum bersandar di Kitabullah

Ikan berenang didalam lubuk
Ikan belida dadanya panjang
Adat pinang pulang ke tampuk
Adat sirih pulang ke gagang

Lebat daun bunga tanjung
Berbau harum bunga cempaka
Adat dijaga pusaka dijunjung
Baru terpelihara adat pusaka

Bukan lebah sembarang lebah
Lebah bersarang dibuku buluh
Bukan sembah sembarang sembah
Sembah bersarang jari sepuluh

Pohon nangka berbuah lebat
Bilalah masak harum juga
Berumpun pusaka berupa adat
Daerah berluhak alam beraja

Pantun Agama

Banyak bulan perkara bulan
Tidak semulia bulan puasa
Banyak tuhan perkara tuhan
Tidak semulia Tuhan Yang Esa

Daun terap di atas dulang
Anak udang mati dituba
Dalam kitab ada terlarang
Yang haram jangan dicoba

Bunga kenanga di atas kubur
Pucuk sari pandan Jawa
Apa guna sombong dan takabur
Rusak hati badan binasa

Asam kandis asam gelugur
Ketiga asam si riang-riang
Menangis mayat dipintu kubur
Teringat badan tidak sembahyang

Pantun Budi

Bunga cina di atas batu
Daunnya lepas kedalam ruang
Adat budaya tidak berlaku
Sebabnya emas budi terbuang

Diantara padi dengan selasih
Yang mana satu tuan luruhkan
Diantara budi dengan kasih
Yang mana satu tuan turutkan

Apa guna berkain batik
Kalau tidak dengan sujinya
Apa guna beristeri cantik
Kalau tidak dengan budinya

Sarat perahu muat pinang
Singgah berlabuh di Kuala Daik
Jahat berlaku lagi dikenang
Inikan pula budi yang baik

Anak angsa mati lemas
Mati lemas di air masin
Hilang bahasa karena emas
Hilang budi karena miskin

Biarlah orang bertanam buluh
Mari kita bertanam padi
Biarlah orang bertanam musuh
Mari kita menanam budi

Ayam jantan si ayam jalak
Jaguh siantan nama diberi
Rezeki tidak saya tolak
Musuh tidak saya cari

Jikalau kita bertanam padi
Senanglah makan adik-beradik
Jikalau kita bertanam budi
Orang yang jahat menjadi baik

Kalau keladi sudah ditanam
Jangan lagi meminta balas
Kalau budi sudah ditanam
Jangan lagi meminta balas

Pantun Jenaka

Pantun Jenaka adalah pantun yang bertujuan untuk menghibur orang yang mendengar, terkadang dijadikan sebagai media untuk saling menyindir dalam suasana yang penuh keakraban, sehingga tidak menimbulkan rasa tersinggung, dan dengan pantun jenaka diharapkan suasana akan menjadi semakin riang. Contoh:

Di mana kuang hendak bertelur
Di atas lata dirongga batu
Di mana tuan hendak tidur
Di atas dada dirongga susu

Elok berjalan kota tua
Kiri kanan berbatang sepat
Elok berbini orang tua
Perut kenyang ajaran dapat

Sakit kaki ditikam jeruju
Jeruju ada didalam paya
Sakit hati memandang susu
Susu ada dalam kebaya

Naik kebukit membeli lada
Lada sebiji dibelah tujuh
Apanya sakit berbini janda
Anak tiri boleh disuruh

Orang Sasak pergi ke Bali
Membawa pelita semuanya
Berbisik pekak dengan tuli
Tertawa si buta melihatnya

Jalan-jalan ke rawa-rawa
Jika capai duduk di pohon palm
Geli hati menahan tawa
Melihat katak memakai helm

Limau purut di tepi rawa,
buah dilanting belum masak
Sakit perut sebab tertawa,
melihat kucing duduk berbedak

jangan suka makan mentimun
karna banyak getahnya
hai kawan jangan melamun
melamun itu tak ada gunanya

Pantun Kepahlawanan

Pantun kepahlawanan adalah pantun yang isinya berhubungan dengan semangat kepahlawanan

Adakah perisai bertali rambut
Rambut dipintal akan cemara
Adakah misai tahu takut
Kamipun muda lagi perkasa

Hang Jebat Hang Kesturi
Budak-budak raja Melaka
Jika hendak jangan dicuri
Mari kita bertentang mata

Kalau orang menjaring ungka
Rebung seiris akan pengukusnya
Kalau arang tercorong kemuka
Ujung keris akan penghapusnya

Redup bintang haripun subuh
Subuh tiba bintang tak nampak
Hidup pantang mencari musuh
Musuh tiba pantang ditolak

Esa elang kedua belalang
Takkan kayu berbatang jerami
Esa hilang dua terbilang
Takkan Melayu hilang dibumi

Pantun Kias

Ayam sabung jangan dipaut
Jika ditambat kalah laganya
Asam digunung ikan dilaut
Dalam belanga bertemu juga

Berburu kepadang datar
Dapatkan rusa belang kaki
Berguru kepalang ajar
Bagaikan bunga kembang tak jadi

Anak Madras menggetah punai
Punai terbang mengirap bulu
Berapa deras arus sungai
Ditolak pasang balik kehulu

Kayu tempinis dari kuala
Dibawa orang pergi Melaka
Berapa manis bernama nira
Simpan lama menjadi cuka

Disangka nenas ditengah padang
Rupanya urat jawi-jawi
Disangka panas hingga petang
Kiranya hujan tengah hari

============
Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
==============

Pantun Nasihat

Kayu cendana di atas batu
Sudah diikat dibawa pulang
Adat dunia memang begitu
Benda yang buruk memang terbuang

Kemuning ditengah balai
Bertumbuh terus semakin tinggi
Berunding dengan orang tak pandai
Bagaikan alu pencungkil duri

Parang ditetak kebatang sena
Belah buluh taruhlah temu
Barang dikerja takkan sempurna
Bila tak penuh menaruh ilmu

Padang temu padang baiduri
Tempat raja membangun kota
Bijak bertemu dengan jauhari
Bagaikan cincin dengan permata

Ngun Syah Betara Sakti
Panahnya bernama Nila Gandi
Bilanya emas banyak dipeti
Sembarang kerja boleh menjadi

Jalan-jalan ke kota Blitar
jangan lupa beli sukun
Jika kamu ingin pintar
belajarlah dengan tekun

Pantun Percintaan

Coba-coba menanam mumbang
Moga-moga tumbuh kelapa
Coba-coba bertanam sayang
Moga-moga menjadi cinta

Limau purut lebat dipangkal
Sayang selasih condong uratnya
Angin ribut dapat ditangkal
Hati yang kasih apa obatnya

Ikan belanak hilir berenang
Burung dara membuat sarang
Makan tak enak tidur tak tenang
Hanya teringat dinda seorang

Anak kera di atas bukit
Dipanah oleh Indera Sakti
Dipandang muka senyum sedikit
Karena sama menaruh hati

Ikan sepat dimasak berlada
Kutunggu di gulai anak seberang
Jika tak dapat di masa muda
Kutunggu sampai beranak seorang

Kalau tuan pergi ke Tanjung
Kirim saya sehelai baju
Kalau tuan menjadi burung
Sahaya menjadi ranting kayu.

Kalau tuan pergi ke Tanjung
Belikan sahaya pisau lipat
Kalau tuan menjadi burung
Sahaya menjadi benang pengikat

Kalau tuan mencari buah
Sahaya pun mencari pandan
Jikalau tuan menjadi nyawa
Sahaya pun menjadi badan.

Pantun Peribahasa

Berakit-rakit kehulu
Berenang-renang ke tepian
Bersakit-sakit dahulu
Bersenang-senang kemudian

Ke hulu memotong pagar
Jangan terpotong batang durian
Cari guru tempat belajar
Jangan jadi sesal kemudian

Kerat kerat kayu diladang
Hendak dibuat hulu cangkul
Berapa berat mata memandang
Barat lagi bahu memikul

Harapkan untung menggamit
Kain dibadan didedahkan
Harapkan guruh dilangit
Air tempayan dicurahkan

Pohon pepaya didalam semak
Pohon manggis sebasar lengan
Kawan tertawa memang banyak
Kawan menangis diharap jangan

Pantun Perpisahan

Pucuk pauh delima batu
Anak sembilang ditapak tangan
Biar jauh dinegeri satu
Hilang dimata dihati jangan

Bagaimana tidak dikenang
Pucuknya pauh selasih Jambi
Bagaimana tidak terkenang
Dagang yang jauh kekasih hati

Duhai selasih janganlah tinggi
Kalaupun tinggi berdaun jangan
Duhai kekasih janganlah pergi
Kalaupun pergi bertahun jangan

Batang selasih mainan budak
Berdaun sehelai dimakan kuda
Bercerai kasih bertalak tidak
Seribu tahun kembali juga

Bunga Cina bunga karangan
Tanamlah rapat tepi perigi
Adik dimana abang gerangan
Bilalah dapat bertemu lagi

Kalau ada sumur di ladang
Bolehlah kita menumpang mandi
Kalau ada umurku panjang
Bolehlah kita bertemu lagi

Pantun Teka-teki

Kalau tuan bawa keladi
Bawakan juga si pucuk rebung
Kalau tuan bijak bestari
Binatang apa tanduk dihidung ?

Beras ladang sulung tahun
Malam malam memasak nasi
Dalam batang ada daun
Dalam daun ada isi

Terendak bentan lalu dibeli
Untuk pakaian saya turun kesawah
Kalaulah tuan bijak bestari
Apa binatang kepala dibawah ?

Kalau tuan muda teruna
Pakai seluar dengan gayanya
Kalau tuan bijak laksana
Biji diluar apa buahnya

Tugal padi jangan bertangguh
Kunyit kebun siapa galinya
Kalau tuan cerdik sungguh
Langit tergantung mana talinya ?

Sastra Melayu
Sastra Indonesia
Paparikan
pantun Banjar

demikianlah contoh pantun-pantun, kumpulan pantun cinta , pantun romantis , pantun jenaka , pantun humor , pantun nasehat , pantun dakwah , pantun gokil , pantun mesra , pantun kreatif, pantun lucu , pantun rayuan gombal , pantun indah , pantun menarik , dll

============
Kumpulan sms pantun lucu, sms pantun cinta, sms pantun mesra, sms pantun romantis terbaru 2012
==============

 

aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

Beethoven – Zinman – Overtures

Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827)
CD 01
The Creatures of Prometheus, op. 43
Egmont, op. 84
Coriolan, op. 82
Leonore No. 1, op. 138
The Ruins of Athens, op. 113
Leonore No. 2, op. 72
CD 02
Namensfeier, op. 115
Leonore No. 3, op. 72
Fidelio, op. 72
King Stephen, op. 117
The Consecration of the House, op. 124

Tonhalle Orchestra Zurich
David Zinman, conductor

 

Fuente :  klik disini

aldilah.bagas.d on April 15th, 2014

 

 

 

Christian Bromberger

Professeur à l’Université de Provence – IDEMEC (UMR 6591)

Co-président du Conseil scientifique du Musée des Civilisations
de l’Europe et de la Méditerranée (MUCEM)

(1989)

 

 

“Le stade de football:
une carte de la ville
en réduction.”

Un document produit en version numérique par Jean-Marie Tremblay, bénévole,

professeur de sociologie retraité du Cégep de Chicoutimi

Courriel: jean-marie_tremblay@uqac.ca

Site web pédagogique : http://www.uqac.ca/jmt-sociologue/

Dans le cadre de: “Les classiques des sciences sociales”

Une bibliothèque numérique fondée et dirigée par Jean-Marie Tremblay,

professeur de sociologie au Cégep de Chicoutimi
Site web: http://classiques.uqac.ca/

Une collection développée en collaboration avec la Bibliothèque

Paul-Émile-Boulet de l’Université du Québec à Chicoutimi

Site web: http://bibliotheque.uqac.ca/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Politique d’utilisation
de la bibliothèque des Classiques

 

 

 

Toute reproduction et rediffusion de nos fichiers est interdite, même avec la mention de leur provenance, sans l’autorisation formelle, écrite, du fondateur des Classiques des sciences sociales, Jean-Marie Tremblay, sociologue.

 

Les fichiers des Classiques des sciences sociales ne peuvent sans autorisation formelle:

 

- être hébergés (en fichier ou page web, en totalité ou en partie) sur un serveur autre que celui des Classiques.

- servir de base de travail à un autre fichier modifié ensuite par tout autre moyen (couleur, police, mise en page, extraits, support, etc…winking,

 

Les fichiers (.html, .doc, .pdf, .rtf, .jpg, .gif) disponibles sur le site Les Classiques des sciences sociales sont la propriété des Classiques des sciences sociales, un organisme à but non lucratif composé exclusivement de bénévoles.

 

Ils sont disponibles pour une utilisation intellectuelle et personnelle et, en aucun cas, commerciale. Toute utilisation à des fins commerciales des fichiers sur ce site est strictement interdite et toute rediffusion est également strictement interdite.

 

L’accès à notre travail est libre et gratuit à tous les utilisateurs. C’est notre mission.

 

Jean-Marie Tremblay, sociologue

Fondateur et Président-directeur général,

LES CLASSIQUES DES SCIENCES SOCIALES.

 

Cette édition électronique a été réalisée par Jean-Marie Tremblay, bénévole, professeur de sociologie au Cégep de Chicoutimi à partir de :

 

 

Christian Bromberger

 

“Le stade de football : une carte de la ville en réduction.”

 

Un article publié dans la revue MAPPEMONDE, vol. 89, no 2, 1989, pp. 37-40. Numéro intitulé : “Espaces du sport”. URL. [En ligne] Consulté le 19 juin 2013.

 

 

[Autorisation formelle accordée par l’auteur le 17 février 2012 de diffuser ce texte dans Les Classiques des sciences sociales.]

 

Courriel : brombergerchristian@gmail.com

 

 

 

Polices de caractères utilisée : Times New Roman, 14 points.

 

Édition électronique réalisée avec le traitement de textes Microsoft Word 2008 pour Macintosh.

 

Mise en page sur papier format : LETTRE US, 8.5’’ x 11’’.

 

Édition numérique réalisée le 19 juin 2013 à Chicoutimi, Ville de Saguenay, Québec.

 

 

 

 

Christian Bromberger

Professeur à l’Université de Provence – IDEMEC (UMR 6591)

Co-président du Conseil scientifique du Musée des Civilisations
de l’Europe et de la Méditerranée (MUCEM)

“Le stade de football:
une carte de la ville en réduction.”

Un article publié dans la revue MAPPEMONDE, vol. 89, no 2, 1989, pp. 37-40. Numéro intitulé : “Espaces du sport”. URL. [En ligne] Consulté le 19 juin 2013.

 

 

 

Table des matières

 

 

 

 

Résumé / Abstract / Resumen

 

Introduction

Nordistes et sudistes

Les joueurs, des figures emblématiques des identités sociales

La présence au stade : un baromètre de l’intégration dans la cité ?

 

 

[37]

 

 

Christian Bromberger *

“Le stade de football :
une carte de la ville en réduction.”

Un article publié dans la revue MAPPEMONDE, vol. 89, no 2, 1989, pp. 37-40. Numéro intitulé : “Espaces du sport”. URL. [En ligne] Consulté le 19 juin 2013.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Retour à la table des matières

 

Résumé

L’analyse du public des spectateurs des matches de football de l’Olympique de Marseille révèle la recomposition géographique et sociale de la ville dans les gradins du stade. Cette situation n’est pas figée, puisque la dynamique sociale de chacun se traduit par une trajectoire particulière dans les différents espaces des tribunes. Spectateur de son propre spectacle, chaque groupe de supporters va aussi chercher, dans la diversité des rôles tenus par les joueurs, sa propre identification.

Mots clef : Dynamique Sociale, Football, Marseille, Spectacle

 

 

Abstract

 

Retour à la table des matières

Analysis of the audience attending football matches of the Olympique de Marseille reveals the geographical and social recomposition of the city in the stadium tiers. The situation is not set once for all, since personal social dynamics results in spécific moves within différent spatial areas round the stands. Part of the show themselves, each supporting teams are also in search of their own identity through the personality and the role played by professionals.

Football Marseille, Show, Social Dynamics

 

Resumen

 

Retour à la table des matières

El análisis del público de los partidos de fútbol del Olímpico de Marsella pone de manifiesto la recompositión geográfica y social de la ciudad en las gradas del estadio. Dicha situatión no es estática ya que la dinámica social de cada espectador se traduce en una trayeetoria particular por los diferentes esnacios de las tribunas. Espectador de su proprio espectáculo, cada grupo de hinchas busca tambien su propia identificatión a través de la diversidad de los papeles que desempeñan los jugadores.

Dinamica Social, Espectaculo, Futbol, Marsella

 

 

 

Introduction

 

Retour à la table des matières

Contrairement à une idée fortement ancrée, les foules sportives ne forment pas des masses invertébrées, unanimes et anonymes, où les différences de statut entre spectateurs s’annuleraient dans la joie festive d’être ensemble. Sur les gradins des stades, cloisonnés en espaces hiérarchisés (tribunes centrales, quarts-de-virage, virages…winking, le public se répartit par affinités d’âge, de quartier, de profession, voire d’origine ethnique ou régionale. Chaque catégorie de spectateurs affiche des habitudes (heure et mode d’arrivée au stade : seul, en famille, avec un groupe d’amis) et des comportements (gestuels, vocaux, vestimentaires) bien spécifiques. Par sa forme en anneau compartimenté, où s’inscrivent et se lisent ces différences, le stade s’offre ainsi comme un des seuls espaces où une société urbaine, à l’échelle des temps modernes, peut se donner une image sensible à la fois de son unité et des contrastes qui la façonnent. Lieu dé spectacle d’une pratique sportive, le stade est aussi le lieu du spectacle d’un spectacle, celui fourni par le public, une occasion exceptionnelle d’expression et de théâtralisation des rapports sociaux. Chaque secteur du stade apparaît comme une sorte de territoire où s’ancre une conscience d’appartenance commune : parmi ces secteurs, certains sont plus fortement symbolisés : les virages situés dans l’axe des buts aux deux extrémités de l’ovale tonné par les gradins, où se regroupent les jeunes supporters les plus ardents ; la tribune officielle, dont les places des premiers rangs sont rigoureusement réparties entre les détenteurs du pouvoir politique, sportif, économique.

Les observations, tribune par tribune, et deux enquêtes systématiques menées auprès du public du Stade Vélodrome de Marseille [1] ont fait clairement apparaître ces processus de « territorialisation ».

 

 

Nordistes et sudistes

 

Retour à la table des matières

Un trait frappe d’emblée quand on examine la répartition des spectateurs : la géographie sociale de la cité se projette grosso modo sur celle du stade, offrant une carte vivante et en modèle réduit de la ville. Au nord du stade se regroupe, en forte proportion, un public issu des quartiers populaires du nord de la ville (13e, 14e, 15e et 16e  arrondissements) ; la distribution des spectateurs des quartiers chics et résidentiels du sud de l’agglomération (8e, 9e et 10e arrondissements), bien que plus diffuse, est particulièrement dense dans le virage sud et dans les tribunes centrales. Ainsi se reproduit dans les gradins le grand partage entre le nord et le sud, qui façonne la cité (fig. 1 et 2). Une répartition aussi tranchée ne procède ni de simples mécanismes de ségrégation par le prix des places (variant de un à sept), ni de pures commodités pratiques (venant du nord de l’agglomération on se dirigerait vers les entrées situées au nord pour s’épargner quelques mètres de marche !). S’installer dans telle tribune relève, sauf exception, d’un choix délibéré. Tel est particulièrement le cas quand un jeune supporter va rejoindre « son » virage. Celui du nord est occupé par une cohorte bruyante, désordonnée et facétieuse, venant des quartiers et banlieues populaires du nord de la ville : l’Estaque, Saint-Louis, Saint-Antoine,

 

[38]

 

 

1. Les spectateurs originaires des quartiers nord

Pour toutes les cartes, l’intensité des symboles traduit le gradient d’intensité du phénomène.

 

 

 

 

2. Les spectateurs originaires des quartiers sud

 

 

 

 

Sainte-Marthe. Ce public, où l’on compte bon nombre de fils d’immigrés maghrébins (fig. 3), est fortement conscient de ce qu’il représente dans le stade et dans la cité : il expose aux regards une immense banderole où est inscrit « NORTH YANKEE ARMY », emblème symbolisant une appartenance territoriale mais aussi, de façon diffuse, idéologique. Pour un jeune supporter des quartiers nord, quitter « son virage » n’est pas un geste anodin mais correspond à un changement dans sa vie personnelle et sociale ; par exemple, fiancé ou marié, il s’installera dans les quarts-de-virage ; devenu artisan ou commerçant, il fréquentera la tribune est, etc. Au public turbulent du virage nord s’oppose celui, tout aussi passionné mais beaucoup plus organisé, du virage sud, fief du « Commando Ultra » ; ces jeunes supporters « inconditionnels », aux manifestations de soutien rigoureusement programmées, sont installés au centre des gradins occupés par un public issu massivement des quartiers sud de la ville. À la banderole « NORTH YANKEE ARMY », répond l’hymne sudiste qu’entonnent les Ultras et qui n’est pas dépourvu non plus de résonances idéologiques (ne l’en surchargeons pas pour autant). Du nord au sud, le contraste est donc net, non seulement entre les origines du public, mais aussi entre les styles de « supportérisme ».

 

Les joueurs, des figures emblématiques
des identités sociales

 

Retour à la table des matières

Cette variété du public se lit encore à travers les préférences qu’affiche chaque catégorie de spectateurs pour tel ou tel type de joueur. On sait [2] que le football, comme d’autres sports d’équipe, se caractérise par la mise en œuvre concomitante de schèmes, corporels et intellectuels, que d’autres disciplines valorisent isolément : la force du stoppeur (qui sait « se faire respecter »), l’endurance des milieux de  terrain [39] (« poumons de l’équipe »), la finesse (les ailiers « dribblant dans un mouchoir de poche »), le sens tactique et de l’organisation (la fameuse « vision périphérique du jeu »), etc. Chaque catégorie de spectateurs peut ainsi trouver sur le terrain de football matière à reconnaître des qualités (« socio-sportives ») propres à l’univers culturel dont il participe. Les enquêtes systématiques comme les entretiens ont fait ressortir, au-delà de préférences communes pour des vedettes incontestées, de sensibles variations dans les palmarès établis par les divers types de public. Considérons, à titre d’exemple, les différences de popularité, d’une catégorie de spectateurs à l’autre, de trois joueurs renommés de l’Olympique de Marseille. En 1985-86, Jacky Bonnevay est capitaine de l’équipe : c’est le joueur le plus réputé pour sa sobriété, son sérieux et son sens tactique ; il est, de façon significative, plus prisé par les patrons de l’industrie et du commerce, les artisans, les cadres supérieurs et moyens que par les ouvriers et les petits employés. Ce « petit patron » sur le terrain réalise son meilleur score dans la tribune est du stade (fig. 4), qui regroupe surtout un public d’artisans et de cadres moyens. N’exhibe-t-il pas des qualités similaires à celles que prisent, dans leur univers professionnel, les spectateurs de cette tribune ? Ces différences dans les goûts et les identifications apparaissent encore plus nettement quand on compare les cotes de popularité des deux vedettes de l’O.M. en 1987, Joseph-Antoine Bell et Alain Giresse. Le premier est le goal camerounais, fantasque, virtuose, facétieux, mettant en œuvre un style que l’on apprécie traditionnellement à Marseille : le panache et l’efficacité spectaculaire. Vedette étrangère, comme tant d’autres gloires de l’O.M., il symbolise le cosmopolitisme idéal d’une cité modelée par de puissants mouvements migratoires. Bell jouit d’une aura maximum dans les virages (fig. 5) où s’entasse un public jeune et populaire, amateur d’exploits fantasques, et singulièrement dans le secteur nord, où se regroupent, on l’a dit, des spectateurs résidant dans le nord de l’agglomération, dont beaucoup sont des fils d’immigrés. De façon symptomatique, lors du dernier match de Bell sous les couleurs de l’O.M., à la fin de la saison 87-88, une banderole portant « Joseph reste avec nous » était brandie par les supporters du virage nord. La carte de popularité d’Alain Giresse est, pour ainsi dire, le négatif de celle de Joseph-Antoine Bell. Giresse est avant tout un organisateur, doué d’un extraordinaire sens tactique, plutôt qu’un amateur d’exploits fantasques et virevoltants. Il jouit d’une cote de popularité maximale dans les tribunes centrales (fig. 6), où se regroupe un public plus âgé que dans le virage et composé, en majorité, de cadres supérieurs, commerçants, artisans, patrons de l’industrie, membres des professions libérales. De façon significative, c’est dans le virage nord, bruyant et désordonné, qu’Alain Giresse réalise son plus faible score.

 

3. Les spectateurs d’origine maghrébine

 

Ainsi, les préférences pour tel ou tel joueur se modulent-elles en fonction de l’appartenance sociale, du style de vie et de comportement des différentes catégories de spectateurs. Vus sous cet aspect, les joueurs, dans leur diversité, apparaissent comme des figures emblématiques des identités sociales. Nuançons cependant notre propos : d’une part, ce sont les vedettes au type de jeu bien tranché qui suscitent des réactions aussi contrastées ; d’autre part, les mécanismes identificatoires ne suivent pas toujours le chemin de l’homologie. Certains spectateurs affichent des préférences pour des joueurs qui, loin de cristalliser l’idéal socio-sportif de leur moi, paraissent plutôt comme des figures inversées de ce qu’ils sont dans le quotidien.

 

 

La présence au stade :
un baromètre de l’intégration dans la cité ?

 

Retour à la table des matières

Un examen de la ventilation du public par origine nationale ou régionale (lieu de naissance des spectateurs et de leurs parents) fait apparaître une présence massive de descendants d’immigrés italiens, de pieds-noirs et de fils de pieds-noirs, qui se sont fortement identifiés à la ville où ils se sont établis. Fils d’immigrés italiens, et pieds-noirs participent très largement aux activités des clubs de supporters, et certains d’entre eux y exercent des responsabilités de [40] dirigeants. La population maghrébine, surtout celle d’âge mûr, apparaît, en revanche, sous-représentée dans le stade et ne participe pas, ou très peu, aux activités associatives, indice de sa faible insertion institutionnelle. Cependant cette situation, frappante quand nous avons commencé l’enquête en 1985, semble se transformer progressivement ; si les pères fréquentent en effet peu le stade, leurs fils forment une forte minorité du public du virage nord (fig. 3) ; cette présence, très localisée, se diffuse vers la tribune est, où se regroupe un public plus âgé. Ainsi se dessine une trajectoire dont nous avons pu vérifier la fréquence relative pour d’autres catégories de population : du virage nord vers la tribune est, au rythme des âges de la vie, le virage sud « menant » plus généralement vers la tribune ouest, plus prestigieuse. La présence de jeunes d’origine maghrébine dans le virage nord, de leurs « frères » aînés dans la tribune est, peut-être, interprétée comme l’indice d’un rite d’intégration dans la cité, que n’avaient pas accompli les générations antérieures.

 

 

4. Où apprécie-t-on Bonnevay ?

 

5. Où apprécie-t-on Bell ?

 

6. Où apprécie-t-on Giresse ?

 

Au total, le stade apparaît comme un observatoire privilégié d’une société urbaine, dans sa moitié masculine au moins (85% des spectateurs sont des hommes). S’y théâtralisent les rapports sociaux et vicinaux, selon des mécanismes dont sont largement conscients les spectateurs. Des « cartes mentales » du stade accentueraient les contrastes repérés par l’enquête, que les usagers perçoivent de façon plus marquée encore. S’y expriment tout à la fois un consensus autour de l’équipe qui symbolise la ville et des différences dans les styles de supportérisme, dans l’engouement relatif pour telle ou telle catégorie de joueurs. Un tel site, miroir d’identités, centrale d’intégration —et non de fusion— dans la ville, mérite, à coup sûr, le détour, y compris pour le cartographe.

 

FIN


*    Maître de Conférences, Université d’Aix-en-Provence.

[1]    La première a été menée le 15 décembre 1985 à l’occasion du match Olympique de Marseille – Paris Saint-Germain, alors leader du championnat, la seconde le 22 mai 1987 lors du match O.M.- R.C. Lens. On trouve ra un bilan détaillé de la première enquête dans BROMBERGER C., HAYOT A., MARIOTTINI J.M., 1987, « Allez l’O.M. ! Forza Juve ! La passion pour le football à Marseille et à Turin », Terrain, n° 8, pp. 8-41. Voir aussi : BROMBERGER C., « Les dieux de l’Ohème », Autrement, numéro spécial sur Marseille (sous presse).

La recherche que nous conduisons, avec A. Hayot et J.M. Mariottini, sur l’engouement pour les clubs et les matchs de football à Marseille, Turin et Naples est soutenue par la Mission du Patrimoine Ethnologique (Ministère de la Culture) et par l’URA 648 (Ethnologie des Pays de la Méditerranée nord-occidentale) du CNRS.

[2]    Voir sur ce point : BROMBERGER C. HAYOT A., MARIOTTINI J.M., op. cit., pp. 14-20 ; et POCIELLO C, 1982, « La force, l’énergie, la grâce et les réflexes. Le jeu complexe des dispositions culturelles et sportives », Sports et sociétés : approche socioculturelle des pratiques, Paris, Vigot, pp. 171-238.

aldilah.bagas.d on July 18th, 2013

 

Disciplining Local Leaders in Community-Based Development

 

 

 

 

Jean-Philippe Platteau and Frédéric Gaspart[1]

 

 

Centre for Research on the Economics of Development (CRED)

Faculty of Economics

Rempart de la Vierge, 8 B-5000 Namur Belgium

Email address of the contact person: jean-philippe.platteau@fundp.ac.be

(Fax: 32-81-724840)

 

 

Abstract:  Largely as a response to critiques of top-down development and of a growing awareness of the low effectiveness of aid absorption in poor countries, the international donor community has recently adopted with  enthusiasm and determination a new approach to fight poverty, called the community-based development approach (CBD).  Such an abrupt shift in aid strategies is questionable, not because the approach is wrong (the opposite is actually the case), but because  massive injections of aid funds in CBD projects, the entry into the field of numerous agencies with little or no experience in participatory development, as well as the pressing need for quick and visible results, threaten to undermine its effectiveness in reducing poverty.  The cause for worry comes from the ‘elite capture’ problem that risks deflecting a large portion of the resources devoted to CBD into the hands of powerful groups dominating target communities.  On the basis of a game-theoretical model, the main aim of the paper is to discuss the use of sequential and conditional disbursement procedures as a way of surmounting such a problem, and to examine how the share of CBD aid reaching the poor is influenced by various elements of the aid environment, including the pressure of competition among donor agencies and the availability of aid funds.  Multilateral reputation mechanisms and intra-community competition for leadership are also assessed as possible alternatives to sequential disbursement procedures.

 

 

Keywords: participatory development, conditional transfers, elite capture, aid effectiveness

June 2004

 

1.       Introduction

 

Of late, there has been growing concern about the weak aid absorption capacity of poor countries.  This results both in low rates of aid disbursement[2], and in the low effectiveness of the aid actually disbursed.  Regarding the latter consequence, Svensson (2000, 2003) and Kanbur (forthcoming) have argued that, when conditions are attached to an aid program (such as the requirement of reform efforts in structural adjustment programs), money tends to be disbursed irrespective of whether these conditions have been fulfilled or not.  According to Svensson (2003), the bias towards disbursing committed funds to the ex ante designated recipient irrespective of its performance, is caused by a ‘budget-pressure problem’ arising from the high cost of not disbursing the money allocated.

The main contention of this paper is that the problem of weak aid effectiveness due to lax implementation of conditionality may also undermine programs of participatory or decentralized development.  In particular, problems of corruption and opportunistic behavior do not disappear because aid is channeled through local levels.  There is no reason to think that patronage is less present at those levels than at the top of the government’s hierarchy.  As a matter of fact, local leaders are typically enmeshed in patronage webs that go up the whole ladder linking the periphery to the center.  Contrary to an idealized view accrediting everything that is local with ‘naturally democratic’ qualities (Watson, 2003: 299), communities or municipalities may actually be more vulnerable to capture by local elites, because local power groups can easily collude beyond the control of higher-level institutions and the attention of the media (Bardhan, 2002: 192-94; Leonard and Leonard, 2004: 62).

This is an important consideration at a time when most bilateral and multilateral aid organizations have included participatory elements in the design of their large-scale development assistance programs, or to channel substantial amounts of aid money through international or local Non-Governmental Organizations (Stiles, 2002; Brett, 2003).  The move to put participation and empowerment of the poor squarely on the agenda is especially noticeable in the case of the World Bank which has made it one of the cornerstones of its Comprehensive Development Framework.  This shift of approach is duly reflected in the World Development Report 2000/2001 (“Attacking Poverty”) and in the massive increase in the amount lent by the Bank for community-based development (henceforth labeled CBD) from $325 million in 1996 to a conservatively estimated figure of $2 billion in 2003 (Mansuri and Rao, 2003).

Using the ‘political economy’ approach, economists have explored the trade-off between vulnerability of local agencies to the risk of elite capture, on the one hand, and their informational advantages (assumed to have a better knowledge of the prevailing local conditions and a better ability to enforce rules, monitor behaviour, and verify actions related to interventions), on the other hand. This is with a view to identifying important determinants of the relative desirability of decentralised versus centralised systems of service provision and delivery (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2002; Ravallion and Galasso, forthcoming).  One critical determinant which these works have highlighted is the extent of elite capture at local level relative to that occurring at central level, which is itself dependent on the degree of relative inequality at local level.

Our paper will not pursue this line of inquiry but will instead focus on ways to improve CBD performances from a poverty alleviation perspective.  Until the rural poor are sufficiently empowered to effectively participate in decision-making and claim their rightful dues, the elite capture problem is, indeed, bound to seriously undermine the capacity of CBD programs to attain their objective.  As a result, CBD will fall far short of the high expectations placed on it by the international donor community if no measures are taken to overcome or mitigate this problem.

In fact, we do not know whether CBD is more or less cost-effective than conventional top-down approaches.  Empirical evidence, as it emerges from several recent surveys, turns out to be unimpressive, therefore calling for great caution.  And the conclusion does not change when we consider whatever (little) evidence is available about the experiences of NGOs, which have pioneered the participatory approach to development (Brett, 2004; Carroll 1992; Edwards and Hulme, 1996; White and Eicher 1999; Conning and Kevane, 2002; Bardhan, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 2003; Platteau, 2003).  It is true that, when different systems of channelling resources are being compared, we must keep in mind that they may not have achieved their maximum potential under the prevailing conditions.  Even though this qualification holds true for both centralised and decentralised development programs, our attention will be limited to ways of enhancing the potential of the latter approach only.

Moreover, our emphasis is on CBD projects supported by foreign donor agencies and not on fiscal decentralisation programs whereby municipalities or local governments receive regular tax transfers from a central state.  The problem of elite capture is especially difficult to solve in the case considered.  Indeed, in so far as they are guided by the objective of self-sustainability, donors want their financial contributions to be of limited duration: aid flows are aimed at making rural communities eventually self-supporting.  Reputation effects are thwarted in such a framework characterized by finitely repeated interactions between donor agencies and target communities, unlike what obtains under fiscal decentralization programs where the number of rounds played is theoretically endless.  In the absence of democratic control by the intended beneficiaries, some device or mechanism must be in existence to complement the policing role of aid agencies through aid conditionality.  It is necessary that this mechanism confers on the poor some measure of bargaining strength without which they would be completely helpless vis-à-vis the local elite.

At equilibrium, opportunistic local leaders embezzle a positive amount of aid money.  Yet, we are interested in knowing how the share of this money that ultimately reaches the grassroots is influenced by various factors, including the preferences of the donor agency, the effectiveness of the fraud detection technology, the fixed costs required to establish links with a target community, and characteristics of the aid environment, more specifically the degree of competition prevailing in the “aid market”.  The key result is that pushing CBD too far too quickly is self-defeating.  In other words, by rushing to help the poor in the hope of achieving rapid results, donor agencies will end up reaching them less effectively.  This is because donors’ impatience drives them not only to skip the crucial steps of empowering the poor, but also to underutilize conditional transfer mechanisms.  On the other hand, assuming that the conditions are favourable to an effective use of the conditionality mechanism, the hope may be entertained that the poor will gradually learn how to assert their rights and preferences, and how to make their elites accountable to them.  If such learning effects are at play, resorting to the conditionality mechanism may be eventually useless.

The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 starts by telling a rich story of CBD of which one of the authors (J.P. Platteau) has got first-hand knowledge through direct experience.   The story allows us to gain profound insights into the nature of the problem of misappropriation by local elites of externally provided funds, and will serve as a major inspiration for the ensuing theoretical exercise.  Thereafter, the theme is pursued by drawing attention to the pervasive presence of ‘development brokers’ who come into being encouraged by the lenient practices of many donor agencies.  Partly building on these insights, Section 3 considers the possibility of a leader-disciplining mechanism using sequential and conditional disbursement of aid funds in the context of decentralized bilateral relationships of limited duration.  Section 4 proceeds by proposing a sequential game-theoretical model depicting how such a mechanism operates when supply of aid funds is scarce and donor agencies behave as local monopolies.  Comparative-static results are derived and interpreted in Section 5.  Section 6 discusses the alternative case in which supply of CBD aid is abundant and monopolistic competition characterizes the “market for aid”.  It is argued that alleviating poverty is more difficult in this aid environment.

Taking stock of the inherent limitations of bilateral reputation mechanisms, Section 7 examines the feasibility of more sophisticated, multilateral mechanisms whereby information about malefactors is circulated and acted upon within the donor community.  The potential role of the ultimate purveyors of aid funds, as distinct from aid operating agencies, is assessed in this new context.  Section 8 briefly discusses the possibility for foreign donors to rely on competition between local leaders, rather than on fraud detection and sanction mechanisms, in order to better reach the poor.  Finally, Section 9 summarizes the main findings of the paper.

 

 

  1. 2.     Elite Capture at Local Level

 

A Case Study from West Africa

 

In the late years of the 20th century, a Western European development NGO (whose identity is not disclosed for the sake of discretion) established a relationship with a village association in a Sahelian country.  This association, which is a federation of several peasant unions, had been initiated by a young and dynamic school teacher, the son of a local chief.  The NGO decided to follow a gradual participatory approach consisting of strengthening the association institutionally before channeling financial resources to it.  This decision was the outcome of a carefully worked out diagnosis.  It brought to light important weaknesses of the partner association that had to be corrected before genuine collaboration could take place: proclivity to view aid agencies as purveyors of money which can be tapped simultaneously, lack of analysis of local problems and of strategic vision for future action, loose and undemocratic character of the association (ill-defined objectives, ill-defined roles and responsibilities of the office bearers, absence of internal rules and reporting procedures, etc.).

After two years during which institutional support was provided in the form of guidance to improve the internal functioning of the partner association and to help define development priorities and the best means to achieve them, funds were made available for different types of investment.  Within the limits of the budget set for each prioritized line of investment, the association could choose the project deemed most useful.  A special committee was established to prepare rules regarding the use of the budget and enforce them.  In this way, the group could hopefully appropriate the process of decision-making, preparation of project proposals and programming of the activities involved (all aspects traditionally undertaken by the foreign donor agencies).  Continued support at different levels (technical, administrative, organizational, and methodological) was found necessary to help in the effective implementation of the different projects.

In spite of all these efforts to strengthen the partner association institutionally, things turned out badly.  Thanks to the collaboration of two active members of the General Assembly (actually two animators) and the local accountant, the foreign NGO discovered serious financial and other malpractices committed by the main leader under the form of over-invoicing and falsifying of accounts.  It reacted by calling on the local committee to sanction these manifest violations of the rules, yet at its great surprise no punishment was meted out and the general assembly even re-elected their leader in open defiance of its request.  The two dissident animators were blamed for being driven by jealousy and envy, while the accountant was fired.  Here is a clear illustration of the support that poor people are inclined to give to an elite member on the ground that they have benefited from his leadership efforts.  That he appropriated to himself a disproportionate share of the benefits of the aid program is considered legitimate by most of them.  They indeed think that without his efforts their own situation would not have improved at all.  In particular, he created the village association which had to be formed in order to be eligible for external assistance.

In a context where the ability to establish contact and to deal with external sources of funding is concentrated in a small elite group, the bargaining strength of common people is inevitably limited, hence their ready acceptance of highly asymmetric patterns of distribution of programs’ benefits.  If the intervention of the elite results in an improvement of the predicament of the poor, however small is the improvement, the latter tend to be thankful to their leader(s): the new outcome represents a Pareto improvement over the previous situation and this is what matters after all.  To put it in another way, appropriation of a large share of benefits by the elite is considered legitimate by commoners if they think that were it not for the elite’s effort and initiative these benefits would simply not have occurred.  In the above example, it is thus revealing that the ordinary members of the association defended their leader on the ground that “everybody around him benefited from the project and, if he benefited [much] more than the others, it is understandable because he is the leader and he made the whole project possible”.  They think it is highly unfair on the part of the foreign NGO to have withdrawn their support to the existing team and to have “humiliated their leader” by depriving him of all the logistical means (jeep, scooters, etc) previously put at his disposal.

As for the leader himself, he openly admitted (during a conciliatory meeting organized by the high commissioner of the province) to have used a significant portion of the money entrusted to him for his own personal benefit.  Yet, he did not express any regret since it was his perceived right to appropriate a large share of the funds.  Did he not devote considerable energies to the setting up of the local organization and the mobilization of the local resources as required by the foreign NGO?  By attempting to curb his power to allocate funds in the way he deemed fit, the latter exercised an intolerable measure of neo-colonialist pressure.  This criticism was voiced in spite of the fact that the NGO paid him a comfortable salary to reward his organizing efforts.  Things were left there and the local radio even echoed the leader’s viewpoint.  Of course, suing him before a court was not deemed to be a realistic option.

Stories like this could be easily multiplied[3].  What must be stressed is that the attitudes involved are typical of rural societies dominated by patron-client or chief-subject relationships, that is, hierarchical, asymmetric, and highly personalized relations in which the poor’s deference and loyalty to the leader(s) is perceived as the best way of ensuring their day-to-day livelihood.  In such a social setup, enrichment of the elite is not deemed reprehensible by the poor as long as they are allowed to derive some gains from the elite’s actions (see Scott, 1976; Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 42).  There is no disputing the power of the local ‘strong men’ and, when the poor sit in a village committee or association, it is essentially because they want to state their loyalty to them (Kumar and Corbridge, 2002).

 

Elite capture and Development Brokers

 

The problem of ‘elite capture’ is especially serious as donor agencies are enthusiastically rushing to adopt the participatory approach because they are eager to relieve poverty in the most disadvantaged countries and/or because they need rapid and visible results to persuade their constituencies or sponsors that the new strategy works well.  Yet, if the required time is not spent to ensure that the poor acquire real bargaining strength and organizational skills, ‘ownership’ of the projects by the beneficiary groups is most likely to remain an elusive objective, such as has been observed in the case of the World Bank’s Social Funds (Narayan and Ebbe, 1997; Tendler, 2000: 16-17)[4].

A perverse mechanism is set into motion when donor agencies skip the empowerment phase by asking intended beneficiaries to form groups or partner associations, and to ‘elect’ leaders to lead them.  In effect, such a method establishes a power relationship that is open to abuse, since the donor agency has little or no communication with the community except through these leaders who are usually its most prominent members.  As pointed out by Esman and Uphoff (1984: 249), “the shortcut of trying to mobilize rural people from outside through leaders, rather than taking the time to gain direct understanding and support from members, is likely to be unproductive or even counterproductive, entrenching a privileged minority and discrediting the idea of group action for self-improvement”[5].

Confirming the prediction of Esman and Uphoff, several studies have concluded that the formation and training of village groups in community-based projects have the effect of encouraging the entry of wealthier and more educated people into leadership positions because of the attractiveness of outside funding (Gugerty and Kremer 1999, 2000; Rao and Ibanez 2001; Brett, 2003).  Revealingly, a major problem confronted by the CBD drive attempted during the 1950s by the Ford Foundation and US foreign assistance programs, and which eventually led to its demise, lay in its inability to effectively counter the vested interests of local elites (Holdcroft 1984: 51).  Being adept at representing their own interests as community concerns expressed in the light of project deliverables, local leaders often succeed in deluding the donors into thinking that their motivations are guided by the collective good (Mosse 2001; Harrison 2002; Ribot 1996, 2002; Eversole 2003).  Their demands are replete with the sort of pleas and vocabulary that strongly appeal to the donors (including exaggerated statements about their poverty) and, in order to create the appearance of participation, they may go as far as spending resources to build community centres, hold rallies, and initiate showcase labor-intensive activities (Conning and Kevane 2002: 383; Kumar and Corbridge, 2002: 80).

Traditional or locally-based elites (elders, heads of lineage, and village chiefs) are not the only sort of leaders to benefit from CBD resources. Frequently, urban elites ‘remember’ their geographical origin and reactivate their rural roots when new funds become available which are channelled through rural groups or communities, or through local governments or municipalities.  For example, in Cameroon, as soon as the decentralised program of forestry management was launched, a “localism fever” set in: members of the urban elite, consisting mainly of senior civil servants and politicians, began to join in local initiatives by getting co-opted or ‘elected’ in local committees or associations, or by featuring as resource persons for them.  They then established “alliances with town-based companies, to whom they have promised their villages’ forests” (Oyono, 2004: 102), giving rise to accusations of “re-centralisation”.

The spawning of local (and foreign) NGOs is another recent phenomenon that must be understood in the light of the redirecting of foreign aid flows.  Acting as ‘development brokers’, political entrepreneurs have been quick to understand that the creation of an NGO has become one of the best means of procuring funds from the international community (Meyer, 1995; Bebbington, 1997; Bierschenk, de Sardan, and Chauveau 2000)[6].  In the words of Chabal and Daloz (1999: 22-24): “a massive proliferation of NGOs … is less the outcome of the increasing political weight of civil society than the consequence of the very pragmatic realization that resources are now largely channeled through NGOs”.  As a consequence, “the political economy of foreign aid has not changed significantly” because “the use of NGO resources can today serve the strategic interests of the classical entrepreneurial Big Man just as well as access to state coffers did in the past…”.

Of course, not all local leaders are opportunists ready to divert foreign aid from the intended beneficiaries.  Several studies actually point to substantial variations in targeting effectiveness across villages (Ravallion 2000; Jalan and Ravallion, forthcoming).  Interestingly, intra-village inequality is often found to be inversely related to this effectiveness (Galasso and Ravallion, forthcoming), confirming theoretical predictions (see supra) and suggesting that the local elite tend to appropriate a larger share of the transfers in communities that are highly unequal to begin with.

Hopefully, future evidence will settle the issue of whether cases of malevolent behavior outweigh cases where leaders are either unable (owing to sufficient empowerment of the grassroots) or unwilling (because they somehow share the ethical code of aid agencies) to cheat fellow villagers.  Results are likely to vary from one area to another, depending on the power structure and class relations, the strength of social movements, levels of rural literacy, etc.  Impressionistic but consistent evidence seems, however, to suggest that dedicated leaders are less numerous in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere.  A tentative explanation for this difference is that African societies have not yet gone through protracted, nationwide struggles and movements of political or social emancipation.  Such experiences help forge other-regarding values and norms of generalized reciprocity without which they are doomed to failure (Platteau, 2000: Chap. 7).  By contrast, in many countries of Asia and Latin America, historically-rooted ideals of social commitment are alive that have been transmitted over generations thanks to the education system and civil society movements or associations.

 

 

3.  A mechanism to discipline local leaders

 

Let us consider the following three-agent decision framework.  At the top is a donor agency (labelled A below) which wants to disburse a given amount of funds with the purpose of alleviating poverty.  At the bottom are the grassroots (labelled G) who are the intended beneficiaries of this aid effort.  And between the two is a local leader (labelled L) who aims to organize the grassroots into a group or association for the sake of securing the funds on offer.  As a matter of fact, the participatory character of the program makes it mandatory that beneficiaries are organized into a collective to be eligible for funds.  In other words, the donor agency will not disburse funds unless it has received evidence that a cohesive group of beneficiaries exists through which these funds can be channelled.  Yet, at the same time, it is ill-informed about what is happening at community level and this information gap is exploited by the local leader for own benefit.  The latter can thus lie to the donor agency about the manner in which the funds have been disposed of, pretending that they have safely reached the grassroots while in fact he has largely appropriated them.

What is being played between the leader and the grassroots is a one-stage bargaining game.  In dealing with G, L thus has a leadership role, meaning the right of the first move: to the G group which he has formed or helped to form, L makes a proposition about the way to share the funds offered by A.  If G accepts the transfer proposed by L, they receive that amount.  But if they disagree with L’s proposal, they create a situation in which both the leader and themselves have to forsake the money.  Indeed, as explained above, it is in the nature of the game that A will not disburse the money unless an agreement has been struck between L and G to the effect that the former is empowered to represent the latter and act on their behalf.  The prediction of economic theory in this so-called ultimatum game is that the agent with the first move will make a proposal whereby he keeps most of the funds for himself, and the agent with the second move will accept such a deal for lack of a better alternative.  In the setting of a one-period interaction framework, anticipating that the local leader will embezzle most of the funds, the donor agency should then refrain from disbursing money.

If in reality aid agencies do channel money through local intermediaries in the kind of circumstances just described, it is either because they do not have a good knowledge about the game that is being played or because, in spite of their pro-poor rhetoric, their main concern is not that the grassroots benefit from most of the external funds, but that such funds are effectively disbursed within a rigid time framework (the so-called ‘fiscal year’ concern or ‘budget-pressure’ problem).  The first possibility, imperfect knowledge of the game, typically arises when aid agencies tend to underestimate the leverage of local leaders, or to overestimate his degree of altruism as a result of the leader’s cunning ability to deceive them or of their own naivety.  Although the second possibility is most often mentioned with respect to official aid agencies (Tarp, 2000; Svensson, 2003; Kanbur, forthcoming), its role ought not to be underestimated when considering private donor agencies such as NGOs, which depend on regular donations from the public and, therefore, need to show rapid and visible results to potential contributors[7].

Clearly, L must be disciplined through an appropriate mechanism, and this must involve the possibility of detecting embezzlements and punishing him in the event of a proven fraud.  Punishment through externally-enforced legal sanctions and court action is ruled out because the judicial system is unreliable in most developing countries where poverty is widespread.  Recourse to informal punishment –that is, a fully or partially self-enforcing punishment– is therefore necessary, and the most obvious mechanism involves repetition of the aid game.  As we know from repeated game theory, the game must have an infinite or indeterminate duration for the socially desirable outcome (avoidance of complete embezzlement) to become a possible equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Kreps, 1990: 536-43; Friedman, 1990: 190-4).

Yet, because they aim at making beneficiaries eventually self-supporting, donors typically want their aid transfers to be of limited and definite duration.  Granting funds for a finite but indeterminate period is obviously not a realistic option.  It would, indeed, create perverse incentives to under-perform in order to lengthen the project’s duration, thereby creating a ‘dependency’ syndrome.  In keeping with our story told in Section 2, we consider a donor agency which decides to spread its aid transfers over several successive periods and to make later disbursements explicitly conditioned by proper use of the previous tranche of aid money.  Theory teaches us that such a mechanism is of no avail, though.  A rational L will embezzle the last tranche knowing that he cannot be punished at a later stage.  Anticipating this, A will not disburse that last tranche, thus depriving itself of the possibility to use a credible threat to punish L during the previous period.  As a result, he misappropriates the money of the previous tranche as well, and the strategic response of A is to cancel that tranche also.  By backward induction, it is evident that even the first tranche will not be disbursed with the consequence that G will not get any financial support.

If A is committed to releasing a tranche whenever no fraud has been detected in the use of the previous tranche, the above outcome would not obtain, however.  It can, indeed, be shown that under this condition L would not embezzle the whole money disbursed, except in the last round of the game.  In other words, because L is keen to keep the probability of being detected within an acceptable range (assuming that this probability increases with the extent of the fraud) so as to remain entitled to the next tranches of money, a positive share of the aid flow will reach G at equilibrium.  The problem with this solution is that the assumption of a committed A is not quite satisfactory.  As a matter of fact, it implies that, in the event of no fraud detection, A will disburse the last tranche of money even though it knows quite well that it will be largely misappropriated by A.  In the following, we consider that A is ethically motivated, in the sense that it would endure an important moral cost if it were to hand over money to an intermediary who would misuse it with complete certainty.  With such a preference function, A would not release the last tranche, which dooms the whole aid game to failure.

To avoid the deadlock of a large amount of embezzlement, we need not make the dubious assumption that A is committed.  A conceptually more satisfactory escape route, probably more consonant with human behavior, is actually available.  The idea is that it is unrealistic to assume that L can freely vary the share of the aid fund accruing to G, depending on the period of the game (that is, to assume that he can bring down this share abruptly to zero in the last period).  This is because the aid game is, in fact, linked to other games that are being simultaneously played in the community and that have an infinite or indeterminate duration[8].  Bearing in mind that the social setup is characterized by patron-client relationships, it is evident that the leader-patron cannot afford to ignore the future long-term consequences of a present action in other related games.  More precisely, he must be aware that, if he suddenly reduces the share earmarked for G, the latter are not going to understand such a move and will therefore react negatively in other walks of the social village life, if only by showing less enthusiasm in their demonstrations of loyalty and even making a ‘bad name’ for L.  Likewise, L may not, without long-term costs to himself, indulge in treacherous acts, such as breaking ex post his promise to hand over a certain share of the aid proceeds to G.

Thus, although L exercises a lot of power in deciding about the sharing of the aid funds, his power is nevertheless constrained by the interdependence of many aspects of the village life.  His image of a ‘good patron’ must be preserved if he is to enjoy the continuous support of his clients in other domains of community life, for example, in situations where his political career is at stake.  In other words, the very logic of the patronage system commands that the patron abides by certain rules or norms which have the effect of constraining his actions and thereby grant a genuine bargaining power to his clients (see, e.g., Scott, 1985).  Note that such rules and norms may involve the existence of a minimum share of external resources to be granted by L to G[9] 

From the above assumption of interlinked games, two implications follow.  First, the share of the aid fund accruing to G is constant over the successive rounds of the aid game (and, perhaps, may not fall below a minimum threshold).  And, second, L’s promise regarding apportionment of this fund is enforceable.  Note carefully that our assumption that G are empowered enough to enforce L’s promise (and to prevent him from abruptly lowering their share), but not enough to actively debate the sharing rule with him, is in line with the story told in Section 2.  There, indeed, enforcement was not the real problem since villagers did not feel cheated by their predatory leader and actually voted for him again even after his malpractices had been fully revealed and confessed[10].  If G were not empowered enough even in the first sense, they would be doomed to be seriously exploited by L, and there is not much that could be done in the short or medium term by an external agency to relieve their poverty.  On the other hand, if they were empowered enough in both senses, our underlying model would become inadequate since the sharing rule would be determined as the outcome of a bargaining process between L and G, and not by L only[11].

Two final remarks must be made in order to clarify the analytical structure underlying the informal leader-disciplining mechanism (LDM) proposed in this paper.

First, we have earlier assumed that A is ethically motivated and therefore unwilling to hand over money to L if it is convinced that the money will be seriously misused.  Another implication of the same assumption is that A will not be ready to forgive L for a proven act of malfeasance, even if it involves a positive cost to A.  This is a fortunate implication precisely because a cost is likely to follow from the need to redirect aid funds withdrawn from a failing association or community.  Without the moral commitment of A, its punishment threat would not be credible and, as a result, the mechanism of sequential aid disbursement would be of no avail.

Second, an important shortcoming of the LDM is that not only the local leader but also the intended beneficiaries are sanctioned in the event of fraud detection.  For this reason, it is not in the interest of G to report malpractices to A at the end of a period lest they should lose any entitlement to the next tranches of money.  To secure their assistance in fraud detection, could A propose G a deal whereby further tranches of aid money would be released provided that they remove a leader whom they will have denounced?  Unfortunately, such a solution is vulnerable to two opposite kinds of risk.  As the story told in Section 2 illustrates, G may choose to side with L and refuse to inform A against him because, in the logic of interlinked games, the long-term cost of severing links with L exceeds the short- or medium-term benefit of aid money.  Note that the long-term cost includes the risk that the malevolent leader is replaced by a still worse figure.  Conversely, community members, or some of them, may be tempted to seize the opportunity of A’s inspection procedure to settle private scores with L, or his family and clan, by bringing wrong or exaggerated accusations against him.

 

 

4.       Modelling the LDM under conditions of monopolistic supply of CBD aid

 

We begin by assuming that supply of aid funds is scarce relative to the numerous communities in poor countries that are eligible for CBD support.  In the framework of our model, a donor agency, A, is posited to be in the position of a local monopolist vis-a-vis a given community of rural people, G, implying that the latter have no alternative source of external funding should the transaction with A fail.  In Section 5, we will consider the opposite situation in which numerous aid agencies compete for access to rural communities.

The objective of A is that as large a share as possible of a given amount of aid money earmarked for a particular community reaches the intended beneficiaries, G.  As we shall show later, such an assumption is innocuous because making the number of target communities endogenous leads to a corner solution.   In other words, all important results are unaffected by our assumption that the exogenously given aid budget is earmarked for a particular community rather than for a variable number of communities to be determined by the model itself.  This being clarified, the presence of an opportunist local leader, L, through whom the funds must be channelled, compels A to strive to discipline L’s behaviour.

Towards that end, A uses a sequential conditional disbursement procedure.  To keep things simple without any loss of substance, we assume a two-period framework in which the second tranche is released only if no fraud has been detected at the end of the first period.  Two instruments are available to A.  The first instrument is the decision regarding the inter-temporal allocation of the money between the two successive periods.  The second instrument is the supervision effort devoted to fraud detection.

A is confronted by two different trade-offs corresponding to the two above instruments.  The first trade-off can be stated as follows.  On the one hand, A would like to spend as much as possible during the first period because it is impatient to see the results of its intervention, out of sheer altruism or because of more strategic considerations arising from the need to satisfy its ultimate fund purveyor.   On the other hand, A wants to defer disbursement of aid money as much as possible till the second period, since late payments serve to discipline L, that is, to encourage him to use the first tranche according to A’s prescriptions (for the benefit of G).  Note, incidentally, that the amount granted under the first tranche must be positive so as to ensure that L’s behaviour can be effectively put to test before making a decision about whether to disburse the second tranche.  Let us now turn to the second trade-off.  The higher the supervision effort chosen by A the more L is induced to convey funds to G yet, at the same time, since a greater supervision effort requires more money to be spent on fraud detection, the net amount of aid available for G is proportionately reduced.

What we have then is a classical principal-agent problem with A unable to observe L’s actions directly.  A maximizes its objective function under the constraint of L’s optimizing behaviour.  While deciding about the way to share aid money between G and himself, L considers as given the inter-temporal distribution of aid money between the two periods and the level of supervision effort exercised by A.  To begin with, let us write the objective function of L, assuming for the sake of simplicity that he does not discount future incomes:

 

,                              (1)

 

where  and  are the amounts of the first and second tranches of aid money, respectively; (1-) is the share of the aid transfer appropriated by L and  is therefore the share accruing to G;  is the probability of detection of L’s embezzlement.  In accordance with our discussion in Section 2,  is assumed to prevail throughout the two periods.  The detection function can be simply defined as follows (note that it will be further justified at a later stage):

 

,                                                                             (2)

where s a parameter measuring the effectiveness of fraud supervision.  It corresponds to the level of the detection probability when L takes maximum risk by appropriating the entire amount of aid money (=0).  This implies that .  Moreover, =0 when L behaves in a perfectly honest manner (=1).   Underlying the above function is the realistic assumption that the probability of detecting dishonest behaviour increases at a rising rate with the extent of the embezzlement.  For example, if facilities intended for use by G have not been constructed, detection of fraud is easier than if technical standards for construction have been violated by the leader colluding with an entrepreneur with a view to economizing on the budgeted expenditures and surreptitiously pocketing the money thus saved (a commonly practiced kind of fraud).

The problem of L then becomes:

 

(1’)

 

One could conceivably add a constraint , where  stands for a social norm prescribing a minimum share of external resources to be accrued to G. Yet, we assume that the endogenously determined value of  exceeds , so that the above constraint is not binding.  If it were, the problem would be uninteresting since the existence of the LDM would not enable G to increase their share beyond what is guaranteed by the local custom.

Differentiating (1’) with respect to  yields L’s reaction function:

 

(3)

 

Using (2) and (3), we also find that:

(4)

In words, there is an inverse (proportional) relationship between the share of the net amount of the aid budget disbursed during the second period, on the one hand, and the probability of fraud detection, on the other hand.

From (4), it is evident that  cannot be nil at equilibrium.  In point of fact, it must be the case that , since the ratio  must be smaller than one  ( may not be equal to zero, since fraud detection would be infeasible in the absence of a positive aid flow in the first period -see supra).  It then follows from (2) that  must necessarily be smaller than one: L will never find it in his interest to channel the whole aid budget to G.

There are thus two ways to interpret the West African failure story reported in Section 2.  Either the foreign NGO was acting candidly by disbursing money, in the sense that it was over-optimistic about the local leader’s personal traits (a situation which would correspond to an out-of-equilibrium outcome of the game); or, it just happens that it detected the leader’s fraud, plausibly because its monitoring process was rather effective (a situation which can be rationalized as an equilibrium of the LDM game)[12].

Applying the implicit function theorem to find L’s response to a change in , the level of detection effectiveness being assumed to be constant, we find:

 

(5)

 

Here is the heart of the leader-disciplining mechanism: when A increases the amount of the aid transfer that is disbursed in the second period, L is induced to raise the share accruing to G.  Increasing the amount of the first tranche has the opposite effect.  Such is the interpretation to be given to relationship (4) above: when the relative importance of the second tranche is increased, the probability of fraud detection is lower at equilibrium (along L’s best response curve), because the leader is willing to reduce this risk by limiting the extent of his appropriation of the aid funds.                  Likewise, we derive L’s response to a change in , the level of  being assumed to be constant:

 

(6)

 

The direction of this effect is according to expectation: the more effective the detection procedure the higher the share of the aid fund that L conveys to G.  We shall see below that the degree of effectiveness of the detection procedure can be somewhat manipulated by A, so that we will be able to write L’s reaction to a change in detection effectiveness as a reaction to a decision variable available to A.

We can now turn to the donor agency’s problem.  Its utility function reflects its concern to help the grassroots.  It can be written thus:

 

(7)       where  stands for the total aid fund (exogenously given) available for a given target community,  is the amount of financial resources that A chooses to devote to fraud detection,  is the time rate of preference of A, and  is the cost for A of punishing L by withholding the second tranche of aid money.

It is assumed that the effectiveness of the fraud detection process increases with , but the impact of this financial effort on s and  declines as  is increased.  Fraud detection also improves when A’s organizational skills and experience in monitoring, measured by the parameter , are more developed.  Thus, one can think that more professional aid agencies have higher  than comparatively inexperienced ones.  Formally, we have  with , , and , where designates the first derivative, and the second derivative, of the function  with respect to the  argument.  Finally, we assume the function  to be quasi-concave, which implies that :

 

 

Given the above assumptions, such a condition means that the sign of the cross derivative, , can be either positive or negative.  The detection function can therefore be written as:   Also note that  is a function of the desired level of supervision effectiveness, according to the reciprocal of the function  :

Turning now to  and , we assume that the values of both parameters are less than unity.  The value of  is smaller than one because A is concerned that G’s livelihood improves as rapidly as possible and the ultimate purveyors of funds, the taxpayers or the general public mobilized in fund-raising campaigns are eager to see the results of their financial effort (see supra).  The value of  is smaller than one because any re-direction of CBD aid fund entails the transaction cost of making contact, and establishing partnership links, with a new community, which is a sunk cost.  The most straightforward interpretation is to consider  as the proportion of  that A is able to recycle costlessly (and of which intended beneficiaries will receive a share ).

Since , punishing a community led by a dishonest L carries a cost for A.  However, as explained in Section 3, adherence to moral values ensures that A’s punishment threat is credible.  In other words, the utility loss incurred by A in the event of fund reallocation, , is outweighed by the cost of violating the ethical tenet according to which demonstrated fraud ought to be sanctioned.

Using (2) and (3), we can rewrite (7) as follows :

 

(8)

 

Or, equivalently,

 

(9)

 

Differentiating (9) with respect to  and taking account of L’s reaction function through (5), the first FOC easily obtains as :

 

,                              (10)

implying:                                            (11)

This equilibrium condition has the standard form of an equality between a marginal cost and a marginal benefit.  Indeed, while the term on the RHS measures the utility loss resulting from the postponement of the aid transfer as
 is increased (and  decreased) by one unit, the term on the LHS represents the utility gain caused by the rise of the share of aid flows that reach the grassroots as a consequence of this marginal increase of .  From (11), it is straightforward to obtain an expression for the relative weight of the second tranche in the amount of the aid budget net of supervision expenditures :

 

(12)

 

Let us proceed by considering the optimisation of  with respect to the second decision instrument available to the funding agency, .  Before doing that, we must calculate  from L’s reaction function.  Equation (3) can now be written:

 

(3’)

 

From (3’), we easily get:

 

(13)

 

The sign of this derivative is as expected: an increase in the expenditures devoted by A to the monitoring of L, by raising the probability of detecting malpractices, drives the latter to reduce the extent of fraudulent appropriation of the aid funds ( grows).  Moreover, the disciplining effect of an increase in monitoring expenditures is directly proportional to the elasticity of supervision effectiveness with respect to the total amount of the aid budget net of these expenditures.  The term  is nothing else than the analogue of the mark-up coefficient in monopoly pricing.  Note that, since  is negative (as the amount devoted to helping the grassroots is reduced so that monitoring expenditures can be raised, the effectiveness of fraud detection is enhanced), this term is positive and greater than one.

Bearing (13) in mind, we can write the second FOC of A’s problem as follows:

 

(14)

 

Substituting the value of  as obtained from (12), we are able to derive an equilibrium condition expressed as a function of  and  only:

 

(15)

 

The RHS of (15) obviously corresponds to the marginal loss arising from the fact that the aid budget available for G has been reduced by one unit.  As for the LHS, it measures the marginal benefit following from the more effective monitoring of L as a result of a one unit increase of the fraud detection expenditures.  At equilibrium, the two must of course be equal.

Equation (15) can be further simplified into:

 

(16)

 

The first two terms are obviously non-negative.  On the one hand,  must be positive as A’s utility would be nil if were equal to zero.  On the other hand,  may not have zero value since .  As a consequence, equation (16) finally reduces to:

 

(17)

 

Equilibrium condition (17) can be transformed so as to give rise to an interesting interpretation.  Defining  as the elasticity of the effectiveness of fraud detection with respect to monitoring expenditures, and bearing in mind that , we get:      , which can also be written as:

 

(18)

 

Clearly, the greater the inverse of the elasticity of detection effectiveness (which measures the increase in Z required to achieve an additional unit of detection effectiveness)  the larger will be, at equilibrium, the loss suffered by G on account of aid embezzlement (the numerator of the RHS) compared with the loss of aid budget caused by monitoring expenditures (the denominator).  This is because, when monitoring expenditures are less effective, supervision effort is less important at equilibrium with the result that the loss caused by embezzlement is relatively large.  Note, incidentally, that when the value of the inverse elasticity is exactly equal to ½, the two types of losses will be identical at equilibrium.  If it is equal to one, the former loss (caused by embezzlement) will be twice as large as the latter (caused by budget reduction).

Turning to the FOC of L as given by (3’), we can write equivalently:

 

(3”)

 

which, combined with (12), yields:

 

, or

 

(19)

 

Again, we have succeeded in eliminating .  After successive transformations, the FOC of L and the two FOCs of A have thus eventually come to form the system (3”), (17) and (19).  It is noteworthy that none of these equilibrium conditions can be written as an explicit function, which compels us to study the endogenous variables simultaneously to derive equilibrium values and compute comparative-static derivatives.  Fortunately, as we have just shown, whereas , and  are all present in (3”), only  and  figure out as endogenous variables in (17) and (19).  This feature enables us to solve the model by proceeding in two steps: first deriving the equilibrium values of  and  using the system (17)-(19), and then finding out the equilibrium value of  by resorting to (3”).

Before solving the model and deriving comparative-static results, however, it is useful to construct a slight variant with the purpose of demonstrating that the chosen form of the detection function, , is not arbitrary.

More precisely, we want to show that the explicit function  can be endogenously derived as the optimal form of a more general function defined as ,  where θ stands for a norm of sharing set by A.  In other words, the donor agency has an additional decision variable, namely the proportion of the aid fund that it prescribes L to channel to G.  In this variant of the original model, the FOC of the local leader becomes :

 

 

 

The problem of the donor agency is now written :

 

 

 

which is easily transformed into the form (8) obtained in the original model.  Therefore, the FOCs with respect to  and  are strictly unchanged.  Bearing in mind that  -since we know from the FOC of L that  does not depend on q-, the first derivative of  with respect to q  is simply given by :

 

 

When this expression is suitably decomposed, it becomes evident that it is unambiguously positive so that the equilibrium value of q corresponds to the corner solution  :

 

 

 

In other words, the norm of sharing that the local leader is asked to follow by the donor agency is one requiring him to channel the whole aid fund to the grassroots.  This implies that the form of the original detection function given by (2) was not arbitrary.  The fact of the matter is that it does not pay the donor to show leniency vis-à-vis a leader because the latter would exploit this lenient attitude by increasing the extent of his fraud.  As a result, the same probability of punishment would apply in equilibrium.  Graphically, the setting of a sharing norm smaller than one would cause the detection function to shift downwards, meaning that, for a given value of , the probability to detect fraud is lower (see equation (2)).  This is not in the interest of A.

It is worth noticing that the expression for  contains negative elements.  This is because there are actually two forces running into opposite directions.  On the one hand, A wants to set the sharing norm as close to one as possible so as to induce L to choose as high an  as possible (this is the disciplining effect).  Yet, on the other hand, if the norm is too requiring, the probability of detection increases for a given  and with it the risk of having to recycle the aid budget, which is costly.  As shown above, however, the former effect outweighs the latter.  It is revealing that, when  is equal to one (the cost of recycling funds is nil), we have simply that , an expression from which all negative terms have vanished.

 

4.       Results of the basic model

 

To obtain the desired comparative-static results in a problem where two equilibrium conditions –equations (17) and (19)– are simultaneous functions that cannot be solved explicitly, the easiest way to proceed is to use the graphical approach in the hope of avoiding the tedious calculations of total differentials and the application of Cramer’s rule.  We thus draw a four-quadrant graph with  measured rightwards and  measured leftwards along a two-way horizontal axis (see Diagram 1 below).  Bear in mind that the feasible space is bounded on the right as a result of the condition , and on the left as a result of    The relationship given by (19) with  expressed as a function of  is represented in the northeast quadrant while the function  is depicted in the northwest quadrant.  As for the equilibrium condition (17), it is represented in the lower part of the diagram: the RHS of this condition, which is a function of , is depicted in the southeast quadrant while the LHS, which is a function of , is drawn in the southwest quadrant.

It is easily shown that the relationship given by (19) in the northeast quadrant is positively sloped and convex in the domain  (see Appendix A).  It bears recalling that  by virtue of the FOC of L (see supra).  On the other hand, we know by assumption that  and , hence the positively sloped but concave function represented in the northwest quadrant of the diagram.  Next, it is the case that the first and second derivatives of the RHS of equilibrium condition (17) with respect to  are both positive, the latter because  is smaller than one (see Appendix A).  The relationship drawn in the southeast quadrant has therefore a positive slope and a convex form.  Finally, the function depicted in the southwest quadrant can be shown to have a negative slope (the first derivative is negative), yet the sign of its second derivative is indeterminate (see again Appendix A).  Interestingly, this indeterminacy is not to be ascribed only to the unknown sign of the third derivative of the function .  As a matter of fact, even if we assume  to be nil or very small, the indeterminacy persists.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Diagram 1: The determination of equilibrium values and comparative-static effects in the LDM

 

The initial situation is represented by the black-coloured line drawn with dots and bars which links up all the equilibrium points corresponding to the four quadrants.  We first consider the effect of an exogenous increase in .  Such an increase translates itself into a downward shift of the curve located in the northeast quadrant of the diagram.  Indeed, the sign of the first derivative of  with respect to , as calculated from (19), is unambiguously negative.[13]  As a result of this shift, we obtain a new set of equilibrium values determined by the grey-coloured line drawn with dots and bars.  It is evident that  and  have moved in opposite directions: while  has gone up,  has declined.  Moreover, deriving the equilibrium value of  from (3), it is easy to compute the total differential:

 

,                          (20)

 

which is a composite expression made of a negative term multiplied by  and a positive term multiplied by .  When  is negative and  is positive, we can therefore conclude that  is always positive.  In addition, it is apparent from (2) that  has diminished at the new equilibrium.  It is also clear that, since  decreases so that  is larger, and since  increases,  rises.   More significantly, A’s utility rises as a result of an increase in .  Indeed, using (9) and applying the envelop theorem, we get:

 

(21)

 

This derivative comprises two terms that turn out to be both positive.  For one thing, the expression between brackets in the first term is positive in accordance with the FOC of L.  As a matter of fact, (3) can be written  , where  so that .  It follows that, a fortiori, .  For another thing, the expression between brackets in the second term is also positive since , and .  Finally, we have shown above that .

 

To sum up, we can write this first set of results as follows:

 

(22)

 

In words, when the aid agency is more patient, it spends less on monitoring but increases the amount of the transfer made in the second period: indeed, because the subjective cost of waiting is smaller, it is more ready to use the leader-disciplining mechanism and to postpone disbursement of aid funds. As a consequence, the leader is more effectively induced to behave during the initial period holding monitoring expenditures constant.  In point of fact, at the new equilibrium the amount of these expenditures is being reduced.  The net effect of these two contrary moves, -an increase in the second tranche accompanied by a decrease in the monitoring budget- is favourable to the grassroots since the share appropriated by the leader declines and the amount of aid money that will accrue to them if there is no detection of fraud by the aid agency is larger.  Furthermore, the utility of the aid agency rises as a result of a more patient attitude on its part.  This is a more significant result than that related to the increase in , since A’s utility is not only purely altruistic but also takes an explicit account of the risk of fraud detection and the possible necessity to reallocate funds to another community.  As for the probability of fraud detection, it actually decreases on two counts: the decline of the monitoring budget, on the one hand, and the smaller level of fund embezzlement by the leader, on the other hand.

The implication is serious and needs to be pondered over: showing more patience in disbursing money for the poor enables willing donors to reach them more effectively.  Conversely, requiring quick results in the anti-poverty struggle is self-defeating in so far as its main effect is to enrich and consolidate local elites, much in the same way as windfall incomes from natural resources can be a curse because they give rise to greater rent-seeking activity (see, e.g., Tornell and Lane, 1998).  At the limit, if A is very impatient, the share accruing to G will tend to a value as low as that obtained under a one-shot disbursement procedure.

The effect of an exogenous increase in  is strikingly similar to the above-analyzed effect yielded by an increase in .  This is because the former change is also reflected in a downward shift of the curve located in the northeast quadrant of the graph.[14]  In addition, the derivative of  with respect to  is again found to be positive :

 

(23)

 

The terms between brackets whether in the first or the second term are positive while we know that .  Therefore, the above derivative is certain to have a positive value.  The complete set of results is as follows :

 

(24)

The lower the cost of recycling aid funds (or the higher the proportion of aid money earmarked for the second tranche of an initial project that can be costlessly redirected to another group or association in the event of detected fraud), the larger the amount of the second tranche, the higher the share accruing to the grassroots, the larger the amount of aid money accruing to them in the absence of fraud detection, and the higher the utility derived by the aid agency.  Conversely, a donor agency which finds it more difficult to reallocate the funds intended for a particular project is less incited to defer their disbursement and, consequently, the local leader is in a better position to appropriate the aid money.  In particular, interventions in low density areas are more vulnerable to such a risk since they tend to involve higher set-up costs associated with longer distances to be travelled, lower education levels in remote locations, etc.

Clearly, the logic underlying the effects of a rise in  is, mutatis mutandis, the same as that described above for an increase in .  This is not surprising inasmuch as the effect of impatience on the part of the aid agency is identical to the effect of a high cost in the recycling of aid funds in the event of a failure: in both cases, the cost of using the LDM is high and the aid agency is therefore induced to disburse its available funds quickly.

Let us consider now the effect of an increase in , the aid budget available for a given community.  From (17), it is evident that such an increase causes the function  to move upwards since , the first derivative with respect to , is positive.  Conversely, and this is the case represented in Diagram 1, a decrease in  translates itself into a downward shift of the above function, which is tantamount to an upward shift of the curve drawn in the southwest quadrant.  As can be observed from the graph (see the dotted line with a rectangular contour), the new equilibrium position is characterized by lower values for both  and .  In this case, as is evident from (20),   cannot be signed.  The same holds true for  and   Of course, since  expresses the budget constraint, we know for sure that A’s utility must decline if  diminishes, and vice-versa if  rises.  What is less evident is how the utility of A per unit of money evolves when the aid budget available is being reduced.  The answer is provided below :

 

(25)

 

The elasticity of  with respect to , denoted , is known to be positive and the same holds true of the sum of the last two terms in the expression between brackets.  Indeed, the definition of  as given in (9) can be written :  which is obviously smaller than , so that  is a positive quantity.  Therefore, the derivative depicted in (25) has a positive sign.

The results concerning the comparative-static for  are summarized in (26) below :

 

(26)

There is an instructive lesson to draw from the above set of results, namely that the well-being of the grassroots as assessed from the aid agency’s utility function (on an aggregate or per money unit basis) is enhanced when the budget allocated to a given community is greater.  This is essentially because a larger budget allows the agency to increase its monitoring expenditures and, as a result, to check the behaviour of the local leader more effectively.  Dispersing aid on many communities is a bad strategy in so far as supervision of the use of funds is then bound to be loose, as exemplified by the experiences of those aid organizations that have chosen to spread their available funds thinly over a large number of projects or communities instead of concentrating these funds on a few communities.
Since  in our model is positive, the aid agency is expected to limit its assistance to a single community.  Such a result is actually confirmed by the extension of the model to the case where the number of target communities is endogenously determined (see Appendix B for a formal proof).  Here, the aggregate budget in the hands of the agency is assumed to be given but the budget available for each community is decided by the agency since the number of communities to be helped is unknown.
The above extreme prediction is evidently a simplification that results from the overtly naïve character of some our assumptions.  In the first place, the utility function of the aid agency has been supposed to depend on the aggregate amount of aid money reaching the grassroots conceived as an undefined aggregate mass.  It does not therefore depend on the number of poor, or the number of communities or locations, who have benefited from external support.  Because the number of grassroots resident in a given community is necessarily limited, it is not realistic to expect an agency to be content with dealing with only one community as a matter of principle.  Second, it has been assumed that  does not decrease with , which is obviously unrealistic: if the size of a project or a community becomes too big, it should be the case that the effectiveness of monitoring is negatively affected.  This being reckoned, we would not learn much by rendering our model more realistic on these two scores and it is better to keep the focus on the disciplining of local leaders by not unduly complicating its analytical structure.

The last comparative-static effect that we want to investigate concerns the parameter  that stands for the degree of experience and skill of the aid agency in monitoring local leaders’ behaviour.  The expected result here is that a higher  ought to allow a larger share of aid funds to reach the grassroots, and perhaps to reduce the amount of expenditures devoted to fraud detection.  It may therefore come as a surprise that these two effects cannot be shown to hold on the basis of Diagram 1, a consequence of the fact that the impact of  manifests itself through varied and complex channels.  More precisely, we know by assumption that the curve  depicted in the northwest quadrant shifts upwards as  rises.  The curve drawn in the southwest quadrant is also affected by a change in , yet unfortunately the direction of the impact cannot be determined.  This is because, if we denote the LHS of (17) by , the first derivative of  with respect to  cannot be signed.  As a matter of fact,

 

(27)

 

Bearing in mind that  are positive while the sign of  is indeterminate, it is evident that the second term in the numerator cannot be signed.  Thus ignoring the direction of the shift undergone by the curve represented in the southwest quadrant of the diagram, we are unable to say how , , and therefore  change following a rise in .  In order to get out of this difficulty and identify the conditions under which the above effects could possibly be signed, the standard approach consists of differentiating the equilibrium conditions written as simultaneous implicit functions and then applying the Cramer rule so as to obtain the derivatives of the endogenous variables with respect to .

The results are as follows (see Appendix C for proof).  First, we find that :

 

(28)

 

The above condition is automatically fulfilled if the  curve is (strictly) quasi-concave.  In this case, indeed, , with the consequence that the above condition is met a fortiori.  We can therefore conclude that   This is the expected result: when an aid agency has more skills and experience in detecting fraud, say as a result of best practice dissemination, the share of the funds transferred eventually reaching the grassroots is higher.

From the above, it is possible to immediately derive another important result, namely that :

 

(29)

 

Again, as expected, the well-being of the grassroots as can be assessed from the altruistic utility function of the aid agency is higher when the agency is better endowed with skills and experience in detecting fraudulent use of aid funds by unscrupulous local leaders.

Let us now look at the impact of a change in the fraud detection parameter on the equilibrium amount of monitoring expenditures.  Application of the Cramer’s rule yields the following condition :

 

(30)

Such a result is according to intuition: an aid agency that is comparatively effective in detecting fraud (for a given amount of monitoring expenditures,  it better detects fraud than a less effective agency) will choose to spend less on monitoring at equilibrium only if its ability to improve fraud detection by increasing its monitoring expenditures at the margin (as measured by  is not too high in relation to its comparative advantage resulting from better skills and experience in detection ().  Note that, if  condition (30) would be automatically fulfilled.  Yet, there exist some positive values of the cross derivative which are also compatible with the above-stated condition.

If is thus sufficiently low to be smaller than the threshold value denoted by , we can also be assured, on the basis of (3”), that  will rise as a result of an increase in .  The same holds true of the share of the total aid transfer accruing to the grassroots in the event of no fraud detection, .  On the other hand, the evolution of the probability of fraud detection, , cannot be determined since there are two effects calling for a decrease, the higher value of  and the lower value of , and one effect driving an increase, the higher value of .  To sum up, the comparative-static regarding  yields the following effects :

 

(31)

 

One instructive lesson from the above results is that a better endowment in skills and experience in fraud detection causes an agency to prefer to defer disbursement of the aid money and simultaneously decrease monitoring expenditures, but only if its ability to improve detection by increasing such expenditures is not too high.  If the latter turns out to be high, the monitoring budget will be raised and the amount of the second tranche might increase or decrease depending on the relative strengths of the factors impinging on (3”).  Whatever happens, the good news is that the share accruing to the grassroots rises and their well-being increases.

In terms of Diagram 1, the situation that is easiest to figure out is the one in which  has a rather high value.  As is evident from (27), the curve shown in the southwest quadrant then shifts outwards - increases as a result of a rise in .  Moreover,  is assumed to be high enough for the outward (downward) move of this curve to be more important than the outward (upward) move of the curve   in the northwest quadrant.  When this is the case, it appears that both  and  have a larger value at the new equilibrium.  By contrast, if  is low, the  curve undergoes a small outward shift or even an inward shift, and  rises in parallel with a decrease in .

 

 

  1. 5.                Modelling the LDM under conditions of monopolistic competition

 

So far, we have considered a situation where the supply of CBD aid is scarce relative to potential demand by poor communities.  We now turn to the opposite case where such supply is abundant.  If perfect competition prevails among donor agencies, and these agencies are selfish in the sense that they are concerned with relieving poverty but only to the extent that poverty reduction is achieved through their own efforts, the share of CBD aid eventually reaching the poor will tend towards zero.  This disastrous result obtains because all agencies try their best to lure communities so as to be able to spend their aid budget.  Local leaders can then play on this acute competition to extract larger portions of aid funds.

Their bargaining strength will be tamed only if donor agencies are (genuinely) altruistic, that is, if their concern with poverty reduction is unconditional: their aim is to see poverty reduced and they do not mind if relief is brought by others’ efforts rather than by their own.  Their dedication to the objective of poverty reduction is so sincere that they are not ready to make compromises with dubious leaders in order to gain a foothold in a community.  To put it in another way, with equal ability to reach the poor, an unambiguously altruistic agency leaves room to a rival agency whenever competition is liable to harm the interests of the intended beneficiaries of aid efforts.  The assumption of unambiguous altruism on the part of donor agencies is too strong, however.  In the real word, many of them pay at least some significant attention to their own interests, if only because continuing employment of their staff depends on the CBD projects that they are able to win on the ground.  This is bad news for the poor of the world.

Fortunately, it is probably not realistic to depict the “market for CBD aid” as perfectly competitive or subject to Bertrand competition.  A more reasonable approach is to view donor agencies as producing differentiated, multi-attribute services.  Monopolistic competition therefore appears as a more suitable framework to analyze the interactions between donor agencies and local leaders.  To accommodate this new framework, our basic model presented in Section 3 needs to be adjusted accordingly.

First, since local leaders now enjoy access to alternative sources of CBD funds in case of fraud detection, an exit option, the value of which is labelled , must be introduced into L’s payoff function.  To the extent that exit options depend on portions of funds appropriable by leaders in other projects, it would seem natural to treat  as an endogenous variable.  Yet, on the one hand, endogeneity of  would make the problem quite tricky to solve analytically and, on the other hand, donor agencies are likely to be heterogeneous in terms of preferences and effectiveness of fraud detection technology.  For these reasons, we prefer to assume that  is exogenous and, say, represents some average exit option as perceived by local leaders.

Second, new interpretations can now be given to parameters  and .  Thus,  reflects the impatience of donor agencies, which is at least partly determined by the competitive pressure of rival agencies: they are in a hurry to establish a partnership relationship with a local community lest the latter should be attracted by another offer.  As for , it measures the difficulty of relocating a CBD project which is especially serious when communities are the object of much attention on the part of donor agencies.

Note that we do not consider the possibility for communities to choose amongst competing aid agencies on the basis of their ability to detect fraud, for example.  The reason is that it is not realistic to assume that communities have access, ex ante, to the requisite information.

Since  is the leader’s payoff in case of fraud detection, L’s problem becomes:

 

 

 

The leader’s first-order condition remains quadratic in , yet the aid agency’s problem cannot be reduced any more in a meaningful way.  We have, indeed, that:

 

 

Note incidentally that, when , the first-order condition above reduces itself to (3), obtained under the basic model.

          Fortunately, the structure of the agency’s preferences may be exploited to understand the impact of a positive , compared to a situation where . Fix the cost of supervision at the level . Consider the following graph, which represents the agency’s choice problem in the  space.

 

Diagram 2: Comparative-statics under conditions of monopolistic competition

 

When  increases, for given  and , A’s indifference curve in the  space becomes steeper.  Simple algebra shows that L’s best response curve still starts from the point of abscissa  when  increases to a positive value, but it becomes less steep.  It follows that the new optimum () lies southeast to the previous one (), that is,  is lower and  is higher (of course,  is correspondingly lower).

Of course, in A’s optimization,  is allowed to vary.  Since  has been lowered,  will increase, at the expense of  too.  This makes A’s indifference curves still steeper and shifts L’s best response curve to the left.  The outcome is depicted by dotted lines. The result can only be a lower  at equilibrium and, therefore, the initial impact on  cannot be reversed.  As for the total impact on , it is ambiguous.

As a conclusion, in a neighbourhood of , at least two results of comparative statics about  can be stated: and .  As expected, the availability of exit options for local leaders who have been caught embezzling funds in a CBD project has the effect of reducing the bargaining strength of the grassroots and, therefore, to lower their share of CBD funds at equilibrium.  Competition among donor agencies is harmful for the poor if it translates itself into an intense and selfish search for communities to support.  It has the additional effect of inducing agencies to increase their supervision effort in order to counter the greater temptation of leaders to cheat.  The net budget available for distribution is correspondingly decreased.  There are thus two factors lowering the benefits accruing to G under conditions of monopolistic competition among donor agencies: a decrease in the absolute amount of CBD aid available for distribution, on the one hand, and a decline in their relative share in this amount, on the other hand.

In fact, in so far as competition also results in a decrease of both  and  (see supra), the relative share of G is lowered on two more grounds (the results obtained under the basic model hold here).  For one thing, competition makes donor agencies more eager to obtain quick results and, for another thing, it tends to make re-orientation of aid flows costlier, thus creating a new margin of manœuvre for local leaders aware that the donor agency has a budget to spend that is more or less tied to the initially chosen community or location.  Clearly, an increased aggregate supply of CBD funds is not an unmixed blessing.  If it increases the number of communities that can be reached thanks to the multiplication of CBD aid operators and/or the expansion of their activities, it also causes the share appropriable by the poor to decline inasmuch as it results in more acute competition among such operators.

As a final remark, it is worth noting that, when all donor agencies are (genuinely) altruistic, the values of  and, perhaps also  are not increased compared to the situation of a monopolistic agency.  The detrimental effect ascribed to a change in these parameters does not therefore materialize.  But the detrimental effect arising from a positive  still exists.  In other words, local leaders know that, if their fraud is detected, alternative sources of CBD funding are available to which they could possibly turn.  In order to prevent that effect from occurring, a reputation mechanism should exist to link up the decisions of donor agencies.  It is this issue that is addressed in the next section.

 

 

  1. 6.                The role of multilateral reputation mechanisms

 

In the previous section, a bilateral reputation or sanction mechanism has been implicitly assumed to be at work.  As a matter of fact, a local leader caught embezzling funds is punished only by the donor agency that he has flouted.  The LDM is precisely aimed at deterring L from appropriating too large a share of CBD aid and shifting agencies in case his fraud is detected.  (In the basic monopoly model, there were no alternative agencies to which a fraudulent leader could turn owing to the scarcity of aid funds).  The problem is that this result is obtained at a high price: L must, indeed, be allowed by A to retain a possibly large share of the funds to be induced to stay with the same agency all throughout the project’s life rather than using the exit option as a deliberate strategy.  From the standpoint of the poor, a much more favourable situation would clearly be achieved if donor agencies could mutually inform each other about fraudulent behaviours in CBD projects and act upon that information to sanction fraudulent leaders.  The existence of such a multilateral reputation and sanction mechanism, it may be noted, would make the recourse to a sequential and conditional disbursement procedure unnecessary.  Unfortunately, mechanisms of that kind are fraught with so many practical difficulties that their feasibility can be seriously doubted.

 

Circulation of fraud-related information  among aid agencies

 

Documented by Greif (1989, 1994) with respect to relationships between traders (see also Platteau 2000: Chap. 6; Aoki 2001: Chap. 4), the multilateral reputation mechanism can be applied to our problem in the following way.  Operating within a repeated-game framework, an aid agency would adopt the strategy whereby its grants money to a local leader, but only provided that he is not known to have cheated another agency some time in the past.  If money is thus disbursed and the benefiting leader is later found to have cheated the agency, the latter dutifully reports the fraud and communicates the name of the malevolent leader to the other members of the donor community.  Before embezzling funds, a leader would thus be incited to think twice because by cheating today he would spoil his reputation for future interactions with the whole donor community.  The multilateral reputation strategy can be shown to be an equilibrium strategy.  That is, if a leader expects every donor agency to adopt such a strategy, his interest is to share the aid fund equitably among the intended project beneficiaries.  Knowing that reaction, the interest of all aid agencies is to cling to the multilateral reputation strategy.  Honest behaviour therefore gets established as a (Nash) equilibrium.

There are several problems with the multilateral reputation mechanism, however.  The first one stems from the fact that the information conditions that must be fulfilled for it to work are extremely stringent: information must circulate perfectly between donor agencies.  This is unlikely to be the case in reality, because they are in large numbers, scattered around the developed world, and very heterogeneous in terms of several key characteristics (size, ideology, methods, time horizon, etc.).  These are hardly ideal conditions for a dense information network to exist.

Is the establishment of a private third party charged with centralizing information (as suggested, for example, in the Law Merchant system analyzed by Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) the solution to the problem caused by the costliness of generating and communicating information?  Such a system can effectively work only if donors have an incentive to detect fraud and report fraudulent experiences to the third party, so that the black list of dubious intermediaries in its hand is exhaustive and regularly updated (otherwise, donors would not be induced to consult it).  Yet, in so far as the detection and reporting of a fraud once it has occurred entails costs but brings no benefits to the individual agency which has been cheated, such an incentive does not exist.  Unless, of course, aid agencies are unambiguously altruistic so that they do not feel concerned about whether poverty is reduced by themselves or by another aid agency.

To create the adequate incentive, the third party should be able to exercise pressure on the detected fraudulent leader to return the stolen money.  A provision that unless an aid agency makes appropriate queries with the third party about the reliability of its current partner, it will not be entitled to use the system to obtain compensation would also make it in the interest of donors to query about past dealings of the partner-leader considered before disbursing money.  As a result, so the theory goes, the threat against potential leaders would be effective and, if caught, a fraudulent leader would be prompted to comply with the third party by returning the money stolen (so that his name is removed from the black list).  Milgrom, North and Weingast have nevertheless shown that honesty will be established as a (symmetric sequential) equilibrium under the above mechanism only if a number of conditions are met, in particular, the cost of information query, the cost of appeal to the third party, and the cost for the latter to recover the stolen money from fraudulent local leaders ought not to be too high.  Unfortunately, these assumptions are likely to be violated in the case under concern, especially because the headquarters of aid agencies are located at great distances from one another, and all kinds of information are costly to acquire, including evidence of fraud in the opaque context of alien cultural environments.  The mechanism is therefore not self-enforcing.

A second, equally important problem lies in the fact that local leaders may not be actually concerned with preserving their reputation because their time horizon is short and they could be quite happy with running away with the money stolen from one single project.  In other words, the payoff from dishonest behaviour is so large compared to the payoff from honest behaviour that honesty cannot be induced at equilibrium.

 

Rating of aid agencies by ultimate fund purveyors

 

Up until now, one key actor has been missing from our discussion, namely the ultimate purveyors of funds from which aid agencies obtain their financial resources.  These ultimate fund-providers create a further link in the game, giving rise to a new space of strategic relationships.  As far as disciplining of local leaders is concerned, their contribution may be positive or negative depending on the way they interact with aid agencies.

Bad prospects arise if donor agencies expect the ultimate purveyors of aid funds to react adversely to news of embezzlement, for instance, through revocation of funds.  In such circumstances, an aid organization has no incentive to report the acts of malfeasance detected in its projects.  In the words of Alnoor Ebrahim (2003: 818), evaluations that reward successes while punishing failures “encourage NGOs to exaggerate successes, while discouraging them from revealing and closely scrutinizing their mistakes”.  What we have here is a genuine Prisoner’s Dilemma: an aid agency refrains from disclosing cases of embezzlement because it entertains the hope that other agencies would candidly reveal their own bad experiences, or because it fears that, should it convey the information, others might not have done it and would then exploit the situation to their own advantage.  That the above risk is real is evident from the atmosphere of secrecy that surrounds the activities of many donor organizations, including NGOs.  This atmosphere of secrecy is obviously detrimental to the effective functioning of a multilateral reputation mechanism such as discussed above.

On the contrary, ultimate fund-purveyors can play a positive role if their understanding of the complexity of CBD processes is sophisticated enough to make them aware of the inevitability of failures.  Honest aid agencies which openly admit of cases of cheating would then not be unfairly sanctioned to the benefit of more opportunistic ones.  They could even be induced to reveal embezzlement cases if the disbursement and monitoring procedures used by donor agencies, as well as the duration of their CBD projects, were used by fund-providers as a yardstick upon which ratings of these agencies are based.  In this perspective, self-reported cases of fraud detection could be considered as indirect evidence of the effectiveness of monitoring activities rather than as signs of failure.  Not only are such characteristics rather easy to observe, but they also offer the advantage of not creating perverse incentives for the rated agencies.

The same cannot be said of other, more conventional criteria used to evaluate the work of aid agencies.  Resorting to measures of outputs, such as improvements in the levels of living of the poor inside the communities chosen, is an ideal procedure but is likely be too costly to be feasible, especially in the case of NGOs with their typically diverse and long-term objectives (see Edwards and Hulme 1996; Ebrahim 2003).  Moreover, such measures could introduce biases in the selection of communities by the rated agencies.  As a matter of fact, the latter would be induced to choose communities in which poverty can be more easily reduced for other reasons than the prevailing power structure (e.g., easy accessibility).

The need for a proper evaluation of aid agencies is all the more pressing as, side by side with serious agencies, there exist careless organizations that do not implement sequential disbursement mechanisms with a view to disciplining local leaders.  Such organizations tend to disburse funds quickly either because they do not have a proper understanding of the one-period game being thus played[15], or because, in spite of all their pro-poor rhetoric,they are not single-mindedly pursuing the objective of poverty alleviation.  Their presence further complicates the problem of ‘elite capture’ not only because it has the effect of increasing the exit options available to local intermediaries but also because it makes the establishment of a multilateral reputation mechanism among all donor agencies impossible.  In fact, in the same way that “bad money chases good money”, the operation of these opportunistic aid agencies risks driving ‘good’ agencies out of business or, else, it will force them to relax or altogether give up their gradual and conditional disbursement procedures.  Indeed, if offered the choice, local leaders will normally prefer to work with ‘bad’ agencies.  And if the latter are numerous enough, ‘good’ agencies will not be able to attract partner communities unless they soften their approach to aid disbursement.

A crucial difficulty remains.  As a matter of fact, it is easier for central funding bureaucracies (such as the European Community or the Cooperation administrations of national governments) than for the scattered contributors to fund-raising campaigns organized by NGOs, to use the sort of evaluations envisaged above and to condition their financial support on the results of these evaluations[16].  The crux of the problem lies in the fact that many donors in the general public have a poor understanding of development issues, partly as a result of distortions carried through the media and the deceiving messages conveyed by aid agencies themselves.  There generally prevails the simplistic idea that failures in development projects are necessarily the outcome of incompetence and mismanagement on the part of the aid agency concerned, all the more so if many other agencies claim repeated successes.

Development aid is seen by many as a simple transfer of equipment and know how to those in need.  The important role of institutional arrangements, power relations, and organizational learning tends to be underestimated.  Therefore, failing projects are seen as an anomaly.  Such a lack of proper understanding of the complexity of community-based development processes is actually worrying in so far as leakages about even a few cases of failure may cause public opinion to easily swing from an attitude of general optimism to one of general pessimism and distrust in aid agencies.  If that happens, all aid agencies will lose.  To get out of this dangerous situation created by the versatility of public opinion, there is no other way than to educate the public about the real challenges and difficulties involved in CBD.  Development education is clearly a public good.  Aid agencies that free ride on this effort by claiming easy successes may undermine the work of the whole aid sector.

 

 

7.       Relying on competition among local leaders?

 

Given the above-explained difficulties arising from the use of reputation mechanisms, whether bilateral or multilateral, can reliance on competition between local leaders provide a more satisfactory way of overcoming the elite capture problem?  Understanding the interaction of competing local leaders (say,  and ) actually requires a thorough modification of the model.  The new game does not result from the simple addition of one intermediary stage, in which the additional leader would decide how much he would leave to the grassroots if he were appointed by them, plus a final stage where the grassroots would pick up one of the two leaders.  In such a model, indeed, both leaders would have a zero payoff at any candidate equilibrium, making them indifferent between being appointed or not and depriving them of any incentive for assuming leadership.

A better insight is gained by the further addition of a move of nature before the leaders begin to play.  Such a move is a draw of the leader’s relative skill (say  and  is drawn in a distribution centered on 1), assuming that a leader’s skill multiplies the effect of funds raised in the grassroots’ utility.  The skill does not enter the leader’s utility directly, but it exerts an indirect influence through the election process.  In addition, we need to spell out what will happen in the case where the fraudulent behaviour of one leader (say, ) is being detected.  The assumption here is that in such an event the other leader () takes over during period 2, which implies that he will be in charge of the amount  allocated by A to the community.  Moreover,  will be bound by his own promise, , made to G before they chose to elect  in period 1.

In order to find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this new game, it must first be noticed that no equilibrium can arise where the elected leader makes a an offer, , lower than what he would bid in the one-leader version of the model. In other words, the LDM is effective enough to prevent the appearance of subgames with very low bids.  Formally, this condition can be expressed by writing that the elected leaders will act in such a way that  which implies, bearing (2) and (3) in mind, that   While in the one-leader version of the model this constraint holds with equality, competition between two leaders may actually compel them to offer a larger  than what obtains in the absence of competition.

Let us now consider the second step of the new game in which it is sufficient to look at G’s utility function.  In any candidate equilibrium, it is the grassroots’ best response to appoint leader  if , where  and  stand for the shares conveyed to G by the first and by the second leader, respectively.  In the opposite case, their interest is in electing .  And if , they are indifferent between the two leaders.  The better skilled leader (the one with the higher level of )anticipates that his competitor is willing to offer  as high as 1, since being elected is always at least as good as being rejected.  Consequently, the more competent leader must consider a bid , by the usual argument of Bertrand competition.

To summarize, if  is strictly higher than the level of  that would be optimal under the LDM with no rival, then the only equilibria of the game are those in which the more competent leader offers  and gets elected.  On the other hand, if  is smaller than the equilibrium level of  in the one-leader version of the model, then competition for leadership has no bite and the game is played as if  were the only playing leader.  In the sequel, we discuss the first case, i.e.,  is played in equilibrium.

In the first-stage of the game, A anticipates that  does not depend on the relative apportionment of funds between the two periods.  It is not necessary to know the value of  in order to make that deduction.  If, ex post, the agency will come to know the identity of the more competent leader (since the latter will have been elected by the grassroots), it bears emphasis that, ex ante, it does not, and does not need to, have complete information on .  In the presence of leadership competition, therefore, the LDM may be dropped altogether.  Since  is a constant from A’s viewpoint, the optimal response is to set  and to leave no further fund for the second period, no matter how patient the agency is (provided it is less than perfectly patient).  It may be surprising, albeit ultimately intuitive, that the equilibrium does not depend on the parameters of the players’ utility functions.

Such a clear-cut result implies that, as soon as two parties (individuals, or groups of candidates) compete, the LDM is ineffective, yet unnecessary anyway since the problem of ‘elite capture’ is greatly diminished.  Nevertheless, it is evident from the above analysis that, as long as the competing parties are not equally proficient, some ‘elite capture’ will subsist in equilibrium, regardless of A’s willingness to effectively reach G.  The wider the gap between the competences of the two leaders, the greater the misappropriation observed under the competitive equilibrium.

Moreover, and more importantly, whenever several competing leaders are present, there is a serious risk of collusion between them.  If the candidates do effectively collude, the LDM becomes necessary again lest G should be strongly exploited.  And if collusion is not feasible owing to the intense rivalry between the leaders, the negative externalities of a mechanism that fosters intra-elite competition rather than cooperation are to be counted as a possible shortcoming of that mechanism.  The existence of such a dilemma -not-too-good relations between local leaders are necessary for the competitive mechanism to be effective, yet they are a liability threatening collective action at village or community level- may undermine the case for relying on intra-elite competition as a way to protect the poor’s entitlement to external assistance.  When the above dilemma does not exist, channeling aid through several local organizations or groupings which are potentially competing with each other may prove a more reliable or less costly solution to the elite capture problem than the LDM discussed in this paper.

 

 

  1. 8.     Conclusion

 

When communities have well-established organizations where the poor are sufficiently empowered, the CBD approach is on safe grounds.  The problem arises when local organizations do not exist or when they are dominated by strong elites driven by their peculiar interests.  Unfortunately, this situation is more frequent than currently assumed by the proponents of CBD.  Till the poor are sufficiently empowered to effectively participate in decision-making and claim their rightful dues, the elite capture problem must be somehow overcome if CBD is to prove more successful than the top-down approaches applied so far by many donor agencies.  One realistic manner of addressing that problem is for donor agencies to follow sequential and conditional disbursement procedures so as to substitute for the poor’s lack of power in the target communities.

When the supply of CBD aid is rather scarce with the result that donor agencies find themselves in the position of local monopolies, such a solution may yield promising results in the sense that the share accruing to the poor at equilibrium will be sufficiently large.  However, this will depend on various factors, including the effectiveness of fraud detection methods, the degree of impatience of donor agencies, and the transaction cost of relocating a CBD project when a local leader has been caught embezzling funds.  The latter consideration points to a serious limitation of a conditional disbursement mechanism since populations located in remote areas, which tend to be the poorest, are then likely to be bypassed by aid agencies.  As for the influence of the agency’s inter-temporal preferences, the implication is that rushing to help the poor is a self-defeating strategy.

When the supply of CBD aid is abundant, reaching the poor becomes more difficult because (monopolistic) competition between donor agencies causes the multiplication of exit options for fraudulent local leaders, increases the pressure to establish partnerships with communities quickly, and raises the cost of re-directing CBD funds.  As a consequence, an increased supply of CBD aid is unlikely to be an unmixed blessing.  On the one hand, it enlarges the number of communities that can be reached thanks to the multiplication of CBD aid operators and/or the expansion of their activities.  Yet, on the other hand, it also causes the share appropriable by the poor to decline inasmuch as it results in more acute competition among such operators.

In the light of these findings, the present rush on CBD appears especially worrying, not because the approach is wrong (the opposite is actually the case), but because massive injections of aid funds in CBD projects, the entry into the field of numerous agencies with little or no experience in participatory development, as well as the pressing need for quick and visible results threaten to undermine its effectiveness for poverty alleviation.  By disbursing significant amounts of money too rapidly, donor agencies enable local leaders to gain increasing legitimacy from interactions with the outside world rather than with their own people.  Moreover, they contribute to create an unhealthy situation in which excessively high value is placed on the sort of skills needed to attract money from abroad, skills which tend to be heavily concentrated in the hands of a narrow educated elite.  Outside money clearly corrupts the process of local institutional development if it allows indigenous leaders to eschew negotiation with members for support and material contributions, thereby preventing autonomous organization-building.

If donor agencies could coordinate their actions in favour of CBD by creating a sort of multilateral information network, or if the ultimate purveyors of aid funds could reward donor agencies that have succeeded in developing effective mechanisms for money disbursement and fraud detection, the problem of elite capture could, in theory, be somehow surmounted even in the context of plentiful supply of CBD funds and numerous operating agencies.  Unfortunately, such solutions are fraught by many practical difficulties.  Relying on intra-community competition for leadership provides another attractive alternative for an effective implementation of CBD.  But, here too, the balance of advantages and shortcomings is far from clear.

If CBD is not to become another magic formula that will fail to live up to expectations, it is therefore essential that the approach is followed in an experimental and gradual fashion, and that its impact on poverty reduction is systematically assessed before more drastic steps are taken.  Moreover, working through local communities rather than through central governments does not dispense external agencies from the need to use conditional transfer mechanisms, especially if effective multilateral sanction mechanisms are not in use.

 

 

 

APPENDIX A : Derivation of the shapes of the curves drawn in Diagram 1

 

First, the relationship given by (20) in the northeast quadrant of the diagram is positively sloped and convex because :

 

 

and

since

 

Second, the first and second derivatives of the RHS of (18) with respect to  are both positive as is evident from the expressions below :

 

and   since

 

Third, the function depicted in the southwest quadrant of the diagram has a negative slope.  Indeed, simplifying the notation by writing  for the function , the first derivative is found to be :

 

 

.

 

The negative sign obtains because of the assumptions made regarding the signs of  and  and because , lest the grassroots would not get any aid and the agency’s utility should be zero.  The second derivative is a much more complex thing that cannot be signed:

 

 

 

 

 

APPENDIX B : A variant of the model with an endogenous number of communities or projects

 

In this variant of the model presented in the text, we assume that A has available to it a given amount of money, , to be distributed among  different but identical projects or communities.  The number , or the amount of money allocated per community , is a choice variable in the hands of A, together with  and .

Let us start with L’s problem, which is now written :

 

(1”)

 

The reaction function becomes :

 

(4’)

 

In the expressions obtained for  and ,  must be simply replaced by , which leaves the signs unchanged.  On the other hand, we have :

 

 

This means that A can discipline L not only by increasing , but also by increasing the budget allocated for each community or project, which implies that the number of beneficiary communities is reduced.

 

The problem of A is now :

 

The FOC with respect to  is :

 

This expression can be said to be unambiguously negative since all the three terms comprising it are smaller than zero.  As a matter of fact, we know that  is positive, ,  is negative (see supra), while the expression between brackets in the third term is positive.  The latter holds true because ,  is greater than , and  is greater than .  We therefore have a corner solution in which  is at its minimum value of one : unless otherwise constrained (see text), A’s interest is in assisting only one community.  The other equilibrium conditions are unaffected.

 

 

APPENDIX C : Comparative-static regarding the effect of a change in k

 

For the sake of computing total differentials, let us rewrite the equilibrium conditions (18)-(20) as follows :

 

(18’)

 

(20’)

 

Assuming that  is the only exogenous variable that undergoes a change, and dividing the total differentials of these two equations by the variation of , we obtain, in matrix notation :

 

 

 

Applying the Cramer’s rule, we get expressions for  and .  Starting with the former, we find :

 

 

Replacing  by its value as given by (20’) and simplifying, the Jacobian determinant can be rewritten thus :

 

 

 

 

All the terms in the Jacobian determinant being negative in accordance with our assumptions regarding the function , we can sign it in an unambiguous manner and look at the numerator of , denoted by .  After some algebraic manipulations, we get the following expression:

 

 

It is evident that the sign of  is going to depend on the value of the cross derivative .  More precisely, we have that :

 

 

 

Yet, we know that this condition is automatically fulfilled in accordance with our assumption that the  curve is quasi-concave.  Bear in mind, indeed, that such an assumption implies that , with the consequence that the above condition is met a fortiori.  We can therefore conclude that

 

Let us now calculate the second comparative-static derivative :

 

 

 

 

We know already that the Jacobian determinant is negative.  The determinant of the numerator can be developed as follows :

 

 

Using (18) to replace  by  in the first term in the expression between brackets, and then arranging the terms, we get :

 

 

 

It is therefore evident, after some simple algebraic transformations, that :

 

 

 

 

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[1]  Our gratitude goes to all those who made useful remarks and suggestions in the course of seminar presentations of this paper, in particular, to François Bourguignon, Louis Hotte, Marcel Fafchamps, Dirk Van de Gaer, and Jan Gunning.

[2]  Over the 1990s, ODA commitments of the European Union exceeded gross disbursements by more than US$1.6 billion each year, peaking at US$2.2 billion in 1994 (Heller and Gupta, 2002: 137).  In particular, in 1996-97, £4.5m of the budget of DFID (Department For International Development, UK) for Africa was unallocated.  In 2000-01, that rose to £18m (The Economist, November 2nd-8th 2002, p. 39)!

[3] For example, in the case of a failed community association for forest management in Palawan Island (Philippines), we learn that the local leader mishandled the community resource and eventually succeeded in embezzling an NGO-provided fund.  It is striking that “no one had the nerve to defy” him, a fact blamed on “a lack of community capacity” (McDermott, 2001: 55).

[4]  A recent evaluation report thus concludes that “building capacity and social capital at the community level are time- and human resource-intensive processes, making disbursements potentially slower and less predictable”.  Social funds, therefore, “may lose the strengths on which their reputation has been built” when their focus is gradually shifted from emergency response mechanisms to longer-term welfare and institutional development objectives (World Bank, 2002 : 48).

[5] In the light of this diagnosis, Cernea’s contention that “NGOs insert themselves not as a third and different/independent actor, but as an emanation and representation of the community” (Cernea 1988: 10), appears almost surrealist.

[6] Thus, in the case of Benin, a West African country especially spoiled by the donors, local NGOs and associations, which are often “empty shells established with the sole purpose of capturing aid”, have multiplied within a short period of time to number several thousands.  Many others wait to receive the approval of the ministry of interior (Le Monde, 26 February 2001).  In Mali, there were 1,467 NGOs registered locally in December 2001 (Coulibaly 2003: 24).  In non-African countries, also, NGOs often constitute “an opportunistic response of downsized bureaucrats, with no real participation or local empowerment” and, inevitably, program officers themselves become involved in the creation of community institutions (Conning and Kevane 2002: 383-84).

[7]  Thus, in the case study presented in Section 2, the problem was actually complicated by the fact that there was a second foreign NGO competing with the one mentioned.  Unlike the latter, however, this second NGO was eager to disburse the money quickly owing to budget pressure constraints (the need to show results to its contributors on the occasion of the next yearly fund-raising campaign).

[8]  For an analytical treatment of interlinked games in a village community setup, see Aoki, 2001: …..

[9]   We rule out the possibility that leaders are external agents who do not feel tied by local rules or norms, and are not engaged in the multiple network of linked games present at village or community level.  As we have argued earlier, indeed, even when they have settled in urban areas, leaders are attached to a rural locale through kinship and other ties.  If this were not the case, villagers would distrust them and refuse to ‘elect’ them in village organizations.

[10] That is also why we did not follow the alternative modeling strategy consisting of depicting the interaction between G and L as a principal-agent relationship (with G as the principal and L as the agent).  In such a framework, indeed, G would be unable to perfectly enforce what L does and would therefore be cheated by him.

[11] Assuming that the grassroots’ share resulting from such a bargaining process is large enough, the LDM would be of no avail: indeed, disciplining the local leader with the help of an external device would not have the effect of raising the share of aid money accruing to the intended beneficiaries.  To achieve its objective, the aid agency could rely on the bargaining strength of the latter.  To be sure, some embezzlement would still occur, but the agency would not be able to do better by using a LDM.

[12]  In this instance, both interpretations appear to be valid in so far as (1°) there were varying assessments about the extent of trust that could be placed in the local leader among the different persons in charge in the foreign NGO; and (2°) the monitoring of the project was relatively serious (the same staff person was involved in the designing and the following up of the project from the beginning and he was regularly sent to the field for the purpose of accompanying and monitoring the organizational process of, and the use of funds by, the local partner association).

[13] The value of this derivative is indeed:

, which is negative since  and .

 

[14] We indeed have that :

, which is negative since  and .

[15] Imperfect knowledge of the game typically arises when aid agencies tend to underestimate the leverage of the local leader within the group, or to overestimate his or her degree of altruism as a result of the leader’s cunning ability to deceive them or of their own naivety.

[16] It could be argued that, of late, there has been a tendency among some aid agencies to organize collectively with a view to ensuring better conduct in the profession (Edwards and Hulme, 1996).  Problems with such endeavours ought not to be underestimated, however.  As a matter of fact, codes of conduct are typically statements about general principles that are not easily translated into operational guidelines and enforceable standards.  It is hard to deny that lack of satisfactory evaluative mechanisms is a serious drawback when it comes to NGO accountability, and that indicators of the quality of their work are very rare, especially if their main aim is the empowerment of the poor (Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 11).  This situation often arises because it is easier to agree on general ideas than to converge on strict and externally verifiable rules.  And if a satisfactory agreement is eventually reached, it is most likely adopted by only a restricted number of operating agencies.


NAUFAL FANSURI, FAKULTAS KEGURUAN DAN ILMU PENDIDIKAN

UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH PROF. DR. HAMKA

LABORATORIUM FISIKA DASAR, 2012

 


Abstrak

Dalam praktikum kali ini bertujuan untuk menentukan panjang fokus lensa positif dan negatif. Pengertian lensa positif atau lensa konvergen, dimana bagian tengah lensanya lebih tebal dari bagian pinggirnya dan berkas sinar sejajar akan di konvergensikan pada titik fokus nyata. Disebut lensa positif karena dapat mengumpulkan bayangan yang bias ditangkap layar. Lensa negatif atau divergen bagian tengahnya lebih tipis daripada pinggirannya dan berkas cahaya sejajar yang berasal dari titik fokus maya akan dibiaskan menjadi berkas divergen.

Fokus utama lensa tipis dengan permukaan benda adalah titik F. dimana sinar yang sejajar berada dekat pada sumbu utama xx, terpusatkan: titik fokus ini bersifat nyata untuk lensa konvergen, tetapi untuk lensa divergen titik fokus ini bersifat maya. Jarak fokus F adalah jarak antara titik fokus utama dari lensa. Karena setiap lensa dapat dibalik tambah menambah sinar, pada setiap lensa terdapat dua titik yang simetris. Pada percobaan ini kita menggunakan 2 cara dalam mencari nilai panjang focus lensa yaitu cara Gauss dan Bessel.

Abstract

In this lab aims to determine the lens focal length of positive and negative. Definition of a positive lens or converging lens, where the center of the lens is thicker than the edges and parallel light beam will be converging on a real focal point. Known positive lens because it can collect the captured screen image refraction. Negative or diverging lens is thinner than the middle and edges parallel light beam emanating from the virtual focal point will be refracted into divergent beam.

The main focus of a thin lens with a surface of the object is a point of F. where parallel rays are close to the main axis xx, centered: This is a real focal point for converging lens, but for a diverging lens of this focal point is virtual. Focal distance F is the distance between the main focal point of the lens. Since each lens can be reversed to add more light, on every lens there are two points that are symmetrical. In this experiment we use two ways to find the value of long-focus lens that is how Gauss and Bessel

 

Keyword: lensa, lensa negatif, lensa positif, lensa divergen, lensa konvergen.

PENDAHULUAN

Dalam percobaan ini kita melakukan pengamatan menentukan panjang focus lensa. Yaitu cara Gauss dan Bessel (pergeseran) untuk mendapatkan panjang fokus lensa yang kita harapkan. Lensa adalah sebuah alat untuk mengumpulkan atau menyebarkan cahaya atau lensa adalah material transparan (umumnya terbuat dari kaca atau plastik) yang memiliki dua permukaan salah satu atau keduanya memiliki permukaan yang melengkung sehingga dapat membelokkan sinar yang melewatinya. Lensa merupakan bagian dari optika geometri yaitu bagian dari ilmu fisika yang mempelajari tentang cahaya secara geometrik. Lensa juga berkaitan dengan hukum-hukum pembiasan, lensa dapat digolongkan menjadi dua macam yaitu lensa cembung (konvergen) dan lensa cekung (divergen).

  1. Lensa cembung adalah suatu lensa yang bagian tengahnya lebih besar dari pada bagian tepinya. Sinar sinar bias pada lensa cembung bersifat (konvergen) sehingga lensa ini disebut juga lensa konvergen.

Sifat-Sifat Lensa Cembung

Lensa cembung bersifat mengumpulkan sinar. Lensa cembung memiliki sifat-sifat sebagai berikut:

  • Sinar-sinar yang datang sejajar dengan sumbu utama akan dibiaskan oleh lensa cembung melewati titik fokus
  • Sinar-sinar yang datang dari titik fokus dibiaskan sejajar dengan sumbu utama
  • Sinar yang melewati pusat lensa (vertex) tidak akan dibiaskan melainkan diteruskan tanpa mengalami pembiasan.
  1. Lensa cekung adalah lensa yang bagian tengahnya lebih tipis dari pada bagian tepinya. Sinar bias pada lensa cekung bersipat menyebar (divergen) sehingga lensa ini disebut juga lensa divergen.

 

Lensa Tipis

Lensa tipis adalah lensa sederhana yang ketebalannya dapat diabaikan bila dibandingkan dengan panjang titik fokusnya. Lensa yang ketebalannya tidak dapat diabaikan dibandingkan dengan jarak titik fokus dinamakan lensa tebal. Untuk lensa tipis, titik fokus dapat dihitung dari jarak benda, s, dan jarak bayangan yang dibentuk, s’, dengan persamaan:

 

Sedangkan perbesaran bayangannya di dapat dari

dengan h dan h’ masing‐masing adalah tinggi benda dan tinggi bayangan.

Untuk jarak focus lensa tipis dapat dihitung dengan persamaan:

 

disini R1 dan R2 masing-masing merupakan jari-jari permukaan lensa pertama dan kedua dan n merupakan indeks bias bahan lensa.

Alat-alat optik yang menggunakan lensa tipis tunggal misalnya lensa kontak (contact lens), lup, atau kacamata. Sementara alat-alat optik yang lebih kompleks seperti kamera atau teleskop menggunakan lensa gabungan untuk mengurangi aberasi.

Lensa Gabungan

Lensa gabungan sering digunakan pada alat‐alat optik dengan maksud mengurangi cacat bayangan atau merubah sifat bayangan agar bisa dilihat oleh mata manusia. Untuk suatu sistem lensa gabungan yang terdiri dari dua buah lensa tipis yang masing‐masing mempunyai titik fokus f1 dan f2 seta dipisahkan oleh jarak d, jarak titik fokus dari sistem lensa ini diberikan oleh:

fgab depan =

fgab belakang =

 

  1. A.  Cara Gauss

Kita dapat menentukan formulasi dasar permukaan yang menghubungkan jarak benda dengan lensa positif V+ dan jarak lensa positif dengan layar b+. apabila dengan menganggap tebal lensa dapat diabaikan terhadap jarak (baik jarak benda ke lensa maupun jarak lensa ke  layar). Maka menurut persamaan Gauss panjang focus lensa positif F+ adalah :

 

adalah kuat lensa. Satuan kuat lensa dioptri.

 

 

  1. B.  Cara Bessel

 

Jarak benda dengan layar di buat sedemikian rupa sehingga dengan cara merubah posisi lensa dalam jarak tertenru dapat diketahui bayangan diperbesar dan diperkecil missal lensa L berada dalam posisi A akan menghasilkan bayangan diperbesar pada layar, dimana V+ adalahjarakbendadengan lensa dan b+ adalah jarak lensa dengan layar. Lensa digeser sampai membetuk bayangan diperkecil posisi ini disebut dengan posisi B. Bila jarak posisis A dan B adalah d dan jarak benda dengan layar adalah s, maka : s = (b+) + (V+) dan

d = (b+) – (V+), sehingga V+ = (s – d)/2 dari persamaan Gauss,

maka didapat  …….(2)

Dengan mengukur besarnya s dan d, panjang fokus lensa positf F+ dapat dihitung. Dengan catatan s >4F+

 

METEDOLOGI PENELITIAN

Metedologi Penilaian yang kami gunakan dalam percobaan atau penelitian kali ini adalah melakukan percobaan atau penelitian langsung dalam laboratorium fisika dasar.

Peralatan yang kami gunakan dalam percobaan ini adalah lampu/bohlam sebagai sumber cahaya, lensa positif dan lensa negatif yang berada dibangku optic, lensa positif yang berada ditengah layar. Mika bergaris sebagai benda, papan dari kayu sebagai tabir atau layar serta mistar/penggaris.

Percobaan ini dimulai dengan merangkai alat seperti gambar. Untuk menentukan panjang focus lensa positif pertama mengatur jarak sumber cahaya terhadap layar (s) dan mengukur jarak bayangan ketika diperoleh bayangan yang jelas, dan melakukannya kembali untuk jarak (s) yang berbeda. Sedangkan untuk menentukan panjang fokus lensa negatif meletakkan benda pada jarak 10 cm terhadap lensa pertama dan atur jarak antara kedua lensa (d) = 10 cm, mengatur posisi layar sehingga bayangan tertangkap jelas dan mencatat jarak terhadap kedua lensa, melakukan percobaan kembali untuk jarak yang berbeda ( d tetap).

 

HASIL PENELITIAN

Hasil penelitian yang kami peroleh pada praktikum kali ini adalah:

Suhu sebelum praktikum = 260C

Suhu sesudah praktikum = 270C

 

No

v

B

f

1

37,5 40,5 0,0513

2

38,5 39,5 0,0514

3

38,4 39,6 0,0512

 

Untuk mencari fokus menggunakan persamaan:

 

 

 

 

Dan mencari  digunakan persamaan

=

sedangkan ∆ didapatkan

∆=

 

KESIMPULAN

  1. Lensa positif akan membentuk bayangan terbalik dan nyata lensa negative tidak akan membentuk bayangan tanpa di bantu lensa positif
  2. Ada dua cara untuk menghitung panjang focus lensa yaitui Gauss dan Bessel.
  3. Semakin jauh jarak benda dengan yang lensa maka jarak lensa positif dengan layar semakin kecil.

 

SARAN

Dalam percobaan ini praktikan diharapkan agar lebih bersabar dan teliti dalam mengamati bayangan cahaya yang diberikan oleh sumber cahaya agar cahaya terlihat jelas/tampak dan mendapatkan nilai s’ yang presisi.

 

DAFTAR PUSTAKA

  • Halliday dan Resnick, 1996. Fisika Dasar Jilid II. Erlangga
  • http://www.scribd.com/24206050/LAPORAN-PRAKTIKUM-LENSA-0-5

 

aldilah.bagas.d on December 19th, 2012

Latihan Soal Responsi Biologi Umum

 

1. a. Bagian mikroskop yang ditunjuk a adalah ….

b. Bagian mikroskop yang ditunjuk b adalah  …..

c. Fungsi diafragma adalah sebagai …………..

d. Lensa yang digunakan pada mikroskop cahaya yaitu  ………………

a                     b

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.a. Pada preparat, bagian yang ditunjuk adalah….

 

 

b. Aliran sitoplasma apabila mengelilingi beberapa vakuola disebut aliran …….

c. Pada preparat, jaringan tersusun atas sel ………

d. Dalam percobaan, diamati sel prokariotik dari ganggang biru, yaitu ……………

3. a. Fotosintesis adalah …………………

b. Penambahan larutan NaHCO3 saat pengukuran laju fotosintesis dimaksudkan untuk ……..

c. Pada pengamatan amilum, pada daun percobaan yang berwarna lebih gelap menunjukkan………

d. Fungsi absorbent karbondioksida percobaan konsumsi oksigen pada hewan adalah …

4. a. Rasio genotipe untuk dihibrid dominansi penuh adalah ………………

b. Allel adalah……………………..

c. Hibrid adalah…………………………..

d. Persilangan yang menghasilkan F1 (keturunan) seperti di bawah ini, merupakan persilangan ………………..

        P = RR (merah)     x rr (putih)

                          

        F1=             RR (merah)

                Rr (merah muda)

    rr (putih)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

5. a. Golongan darah hasil reaksi tetes darah dengan anti A dan anti B sebagai berikut adalah …

 

 

b. Prinsip penentuan golongan darah sistem ABO adalah ….

c. Genotif  golongan darah B heterozigote adalah ….

d. Pembentukan antigen A ditentukan oleh alel …

6. a. Derivat epidermis pada preparat ini adalah …………………

 

b. Bagian yang ditunjuk merupakan …..

c. Sel tersebut mengalami penebalan ……….

d. Unsur xilem yang ditunjuk adalah …

7.a. Nama spesies ini adalah ……………..

A

B

 

 

 

b. Bagian yang ditunjuk A adalah …………..

c. Bagian yang ditunjuk B adalah …..

d. Lumut memiliki bagian gametofit berupa ………………, ……………… dan ………………..

 

 

 

 

8.a. sel pada preparat ini adalah ………….

B

A

 

b. Bagian yang di tunjuk A adalah …………..

c. Dan bagian B adalah …………………

d. preparat ini adalah kelenjar tiroid mencit, bagian yang ditunjuk adalah …

 

 

 

9  a.Bagian yang ditunjuk adalah ………….

 

 

b. bagian dari Kacang tanah  yang berfungsi sebagai cadangan makanan ……………..

c. Jahe berkembang biak secara vegetatif dengan …………..

d. Alat reproduksi jantan pada Angiospermae adalah …………..

10  a. Evolusi adalah ……………….

b. Bagaimana terjadinya seleksi alam ……………

11 a. Plasma nutfah (germplasm) adalah …………………………

b. Variasi fenotipik dipengaruhi oleh ………………………

c. Komunitas adalah ……………………

d. Apakah yang dimaksud dengan ekosistem akuatik …………………………

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contoh point2 pembahasan acara 2

ACARA II

  • Bandingkan antara bagian daun yang ditutup dengan aluminium foil dan bagian daun yang tidak ditutup ! Beri penjelasan !

PenjeLasan :

Pada daun yang ditutup hasilnya setelah diuji dengan JKJ berwarna lebih terang daripada daun yang tidak ditutup. Pada daun yang ditutup warnanya lebih terang karena klorofil dalam daun tersebut terhalang oleh kertas timah sehingga tidak dapat menangkap cahaya untuk membantu proses fotosintesis. Sehingga ketika dimasukkan dalam larutan JKJ warnanya lebih terang karena hanya mengandung sedikit amilum. Pada daun yang tidak ditutup klorofilnya dapat menangkap cahaya matahari sehingga mampu melakukan proses fotosintesis dan menghasilkan cadangan makanan berupa amilum, yang apabila dimasukkan dalam larutan JKJ menunjukkan warna yang lebih gelap. Warna daun yang lebih gelap meninjukkan bahwa pada daun tersebut terjadi proses fotosintesis yang ditandai  dengan adanya karbihidrat, yang apabila diuji dengan JKJ menjadi berwarna hitam atau ungu.

  • Bandingkan antara bagian permukaan atas dan bawah daun yang tidak ditutup !

PenjeLasan :

Pada bagian permukaan atas daun warnanya relatif lebih berwarna gelap dibandingkan permukaan bawah daun. Hal ini disebabkan karena permukaan atas daun lebih intensif dalam menerima sinar matahari oleh karena posisinya yang menghadap ke atas (mengarah ke arah datangnya sinar matahari), sehingga lebih aktif melakukan proses fotosintesis dan menghasilkan cadangan makanan, yaitu berupa pati (amilum) yang lebih banyak. Sedangkan permukaan bawah daun, karena posisinya menghadap ke bawah kurang mendapatkan sinar matahari, sehingga proses fotosintesisnya kurang intensif dan mengakibatkan pembentukan cadangan makanan (amilum) lebih lambat dan relatif sedikit.

  • Bandingkan antara daun monokotil dan daun dikotil. Jelaskan !

PenjeLasan :

Kandungan amilum pada daun tanaman dikotil relatif lebih banyak daripada tanaman monokotil. Hal ini terlihat dari hasil tes dengan JKJ yang menunjukkan bahwa intensitas warna ungu pada tanaman dikotil lebih pekat daripada daun pada tanaman monokotil. Sebagian besar daun tanaman monokotil setelah dites dengan larutan JKj menunjukkan hasil negatif (tidak menghasilkan perubahan warna menjadi ungu). Ini terjadi karena tanaman monokotil menyimpan cadangan makanan dalam bentuk sukrosa, sedangkan tanaman dikotil dalam bentuk amilum

Tanaman monokotil kandungan sukrosanya relatif lebih banyak daripada tanaman monokotil. Hal ini disebabkan karena umumnya tanaman monokotil merupakan tanaman C4 yang memiliki kapasitas fotosintetik yang tinggi. Keadaan yang menguntungkan tanaman C4 adalah hari yang sangat cerah dan panas. Selain itu juga karena posisi daun monokotil yang memungkinkan permukaan atas dan bawah daun memperoleh cukup sinar matahari, sehingga proses fotosintesis bisa berjalan lebih cepat.

 

  • Apa fungsi penutupan bagian daun dengan aluminium foil ? Bagaimana  pengaruh penutupan daun tersebut terhadap proses fotosintesis ?

PenjeLasan :

Tujuan dari penutupan sebagian daun adalah agar bagian daun yang ditutup dengan kertas timah tersebut tidak terkena sinar matahari, sehingga pada bagian daun yang ditutup tersebut klorofilnya tidak mampu menangkap sinar matahari sehingga pada bagian daun tersebut tidak berlangsung prose fotosintesis. Sedangkan bagian daun yang tidak ditutup dengan kertas timah, klorofilnya tetap mampu menangkap sinar matahri sehingga tetap bisa melakukan proses fofosintesis. Dengan demikian, setelah beberapa hari dilakukan penutupan pada sebagian daun, kemudian daun tersebut direndam dalam larutan JKJ, maka dapat dibandingkan perubahan warna pada bagian daun yang ditutup dan bagian daun yang tidak ditutup daun.

  • Apakah fungsi alkohol panas dan larutan JKJ ?

PenjeLasan :

Fungsi dari perendaman daun dalam alkohol panas 95% adalah untuk melarutkan klorofil yang terdapat di dalam daun, sehingga klorofil hilang dari daun. Dengan demikian nantinya setelah daun direndam dalam larutan JKJ perubahan warna yang terjadi dapat terlihat jelas. Sedangkan fungsi dari larutan JKJ sendiri adalah untuk menguji kandungan amilum yang terdapat pada daun. Daun yang mengandung amilum jika dicelupkan dalam larutan JKJ akan menghasilkan perubahan warna menjadi ungu kecoklatan. Sedangkan jika daun yang tidak mengandung amilum dicelupkan dalam larutan JKJ akan menghasilkan perubahan warna lain. Semakin tua warna ungu yang dihasilkan menunjukkan bahwa kandungan amilumnya semakin banyak.

  • Faktor-faktor (luar dan dalam) apa sajakah yang mempengaruhi pembentukan amilum ? Jelaskan !

PenjeLasan :

Faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi pembentukan amilum antara lain suhu, spesies tanaman, ketersediaan air dan hara, kemampuan fotosintesis, konsentrasi ion-ion H+, dan konsentrasi gula. Penurunan suhu menyebabkan penurunan kandungan amilum. Peningkatan persediaan air menyebabkan penyusunan amilum menjadi meningkat. Sedangkan penurunan pH mengakibatkan peningkatan kandungan amilum pada daun, pH di atas 7 akan terbentuk gula sedangkan gula akan terbentuk menjadi amilum jika pH turun sampai di bawah 7. Pembentukan amilum juga meningkat dengan adanya peningkatan pembentukan gula hasil proses fotosintesis.

  • Jelaskan perbedaan warna bagian daun yang mengandung amilum dan yang tidak mengandung amilum dalam percobaan ini !

PenjeLasan :

Bagian daun yang tidak ditutup setelah direndam dalam JKJ menunjukkan hasil positif mengandung amilum, yaitu ditandai dengan perubahan warna menjadi keunguan. Sedangkan pada bagian daun yang ditutup menunjukkan hasil negatif (tidak mengandung amilum), meskipun tetap menunjukkan hasil positif (warna menjadi keunguan), namun kandungan amilumnya sangat sedikit yaitu ditandai dengan warna ungu yang relatif lebih terang dibandigkan bagian daun yang tidak ditutup.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6. Peraga berupa darah golongan O yang ditetesi serum anti A dan anti B

a. Uji yang Anda hadapi menunjukkan golongan darah(tidak menggunpal keduanya)…

jawab: gol darah O

b. Antibodi yang dimiliki oleh golongan darah tersebut yaitu…

jawab: α dan b

c. Tuliskan genotip golongan darah tersebut!

jawab: IoIo atau Ioi atau ii

 

7. (Peraga berupa preparat sayatan epidermis bawah daun Nicotiana tabaccum di bawah mikroskop)

Pada preparat sayatan epidermis bawah daun Nicotiana tabaccum yang diamati adalah (a)……dengan sel penutup berbentuk  (b)…….

jawab: (a) stomata  (b) ginjal

c. Derivat epidermis pada batang Saccharum officinarum berupa…

(Tanpa peraga)

jawab : sel silika dan sel gabus

 

8. (Peraga berupa Cycas rumphii, Allamanda cathartica, Nephrolepis/Adianthum, dan Hymenocallis sp. masing-masing diberi huruf A, B, C, dan D)

Dari spesimen yang Anda hadapi, manakah yang merupakan…

a. tumbuhan dikotil

b. tumbuhan Gymnospermae

c. tumbuhan paku

jawab: B, A, C

 

9. (Peraga berupa preparat awetan atau herbarium Sargassum sp.)

a. Nama spesimen yang Anda hadapi adalah…

jawab: Sargassum sp.

b. Bagian yang ditunjuk / diberi label A adalah…

(Peraga diberi label A pada bagian alat pelekat)

jawab: alat pelekat

c. Bagian yang ditunjuk B adalah…

(Peraga ditunjuk B pada bagian gelembung udara)

jawab: gelembung udara

 

10. a. Jaringan epitelium ditemukan pada organ…

jawab: kelenjar tiroid atau vagina mencit

Jaringan epitelium tersebut berbentuk……..(b)yang bertumpu pada…….(c)

jawab: (b) kubus selapis  (c) membrana basalis

 

11. a. Jaringan yang diamati pada preparat trakea kambing yaitu…

jawab: jaringan tulang rawan

b. Otot seran lintang dapat ditemui pada organ…

jawab: lidah mencit

c. Bagian yang ditunjuk huruf C disebut…

(Beri peraga berupa GAMBAR otot seran lintang penampang membujur, tunjuk dengan huruf C pada inti sel perifer)

jawab: inti perifer

 

12. (Peraga berupa ikan nila Oreochromis niloticus yang dibedah sehingga terlihat organ dalamnya)

a. Spesimen yang Anda hadapi memiliki nama ilmiah…

jawab: Oreochromis niloticus

b. Bagian yang dilabel huruf B adalah…

(Peraga dilabeli huruf B pada bagian sirip punggung)

jawab: Pinna dorsalis

c. Bagian yang dilabel huruf C yaitu…

(Peraga diberi label C pada organ hepar)

jawab: hepar

 

13. (Beri peraga burung dara Columba livia)

a. Vertebrata yang Anda hadapi termasuk dalam anggota Classis…

jawab: Aves

b. Memiliki ciri khas berupa (B)…

(Peraga dilabel huruf B pada bagian paruh)

jawab: rostrum

c. Anggota gerak berupa sayap disebut…

jawab: ekstremitas superior

 

14. Sebutkan 3 ciri khas yang dijumpai pada anggota Classis Mammalia!

jawab: a. memiliki daun telinga

b. tubuh ditutupi oleh rambut

c. memilki glandula mammae

 

15.a. Unsur-unsur xilem dapat diamati pada preparat awetan maserasi batang…

jawab: Riccinus communis

Sebutkan 2 unsur xilem……(b)………..(c)

jawab: (pilih 2) trakea, trakeida, serabut xilem, parenkim kayu

 

16.a. Jaringan adalah….

jawab: kumpulan sel yang memiliki bentuk, asal-usul, dan fungsi yang sama

Sebutkan 2 ciri jaringan dewasa pada tumbuhan!(b) dan (c)

jawab: (pilih 2) vakuola besar, sitoplasma sedikit, dinding sel mengalami     penebalan

17.a. Gambar di hadapan Anda merupakan telur Bufo sp. pada fase…

(Beri peraga GAMBAR telur yang sudah dibuahi)

jawab: telur Bufo sp. yang sudah dibuahi

b. Bagian polus animalis ditunjukkan oleh huruf…

(Gambar diberi huruf A, B, C masing-masing pada bagian polus animalis,   gray crescent, dan polus vegetativus)

jawab: A

c. Di bidang ekuatorial Anda menjumpai bagian yang disebut…

jawab : Gray crescent

 

18. Tuliskan cara reproduksi aseksual dari masing-masing spesimen yang ada dihadapan Anda!

(Beri peraga Jahe, bawang merah, cocor bebek yang masing-masing diberi label A,B, dan C)

Jawab : a. rhizoma

b. umbi lapis

c. tunas adventif

 

19.  Beri peraga atau gambar biji kacang tanah yang dibelah. Ditunjuk bagian PLUMULA dengan huruf A dan RADIKULA dengan huruf B

a. Bagian A disebut…

jawab : plumula

Bagian B disebut……(b) yang akan mengalami perkembangan menjadi…..(c)

Jawab : b. radikula

c. akar

 

20. Bunga sepatu memiliki nama ilmiah Hibiscus rosa-sinensis.

Berdasarkan pernyataan diatas, jawablah pertanyaan berikut!

a. Hibiscus menunjukkan nama….

Jawab: nama marga / genus

b. Sedangkan rosa-sinensis menunjukkan….

Jawab : nama penunjuk spesies

c. Keanekaragaman Hibiscus rosa-sinensis pada tingkat varietas dapat diamati menggunakan ciri-ciri morfologi atau fenotip. Tuliskan 2 karakter fenotip yang dapat diamati!

Jawab : warna petala, jumlah petala, panjang petala, dll